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KICKING AWAY RESPONSIBILITY:
FIFA’S ROLE IN RESPONSE TO MIGRANT WORKER
ABUSES IN QATAR’S 2022 WORLD CUP
“We know the image that will be shown of Qatar when organising
the World Cup.  When you live there, you see how inhumanly the
workers are treated.  This is killing thousands of workers. That’s
why I protest against the 2022 World Cup in Qatar . . . .  ‘How
can we play in a stadium that is build [sic] with blood . . . ?’”1
I. INTRODUCTION
For the first time in soccer history, the World Cup is coming to
the Middle East.2  Qatar, a small country at the heart of the Persian
Gulf, has been elected to host the 2022 World Cup.3  The Gulf na-
tion worked hard to sway the votes; Qatar’s inspired bid even de-
feated the United States, which was far behind as a second-runner.4
Although Qatar’s election continues to generate controversy, the
soccer governing body Fédération Internationale de Football Asso-
ciation (FIFA) has defended and supported the legitimacy of
Qatar’s winning bid.5  The Qatari Emirate has ambitious plans in
1. See Ouaddou Wins Lawsuit Against Qatari Club, FIFPRO (Feb. 12, 2014),
http://www.fifpro.org/en/news/ouaddou-wins-principle-lawsuit-against-qatari-
club?highlight=WyJxYXRhciIsInFhdGFyJ3MiLCIncWF0YXInIl0= (quoting soccer
player Abdes Ouaddou’s interview with Geremi Njitap after Ouaddou’s legal vic-
tory against Qatari team, which withheld his pay and denied him exit visa).
2. See England Miss Out to Russia in 2018 World Cup Vote, BBC NEWS (Dec. 2,
2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/9250585.stm (announcing that
Qatar was chosen to host 2022 World Cup). See also FIFA WORLD CUP FINAL, FIFA,
http://www.fifa.com/tournaments/archive/worldcup/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2014)
(showing history of previous World Cups where no Middle Eastern country ever
hosted or won tournament).
3. See Russia and Qatar to Host 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups, Respectively, FIFA
.COM (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/russia2018/organisation/
media/newsid=1344971/ (explaining that 22 members of FIFA Executive Commit-
tee were entitled to vote and Qatar won absolute majority vote for 2022).
4. See Grant Wahl, As Concerns Continue to Build, Will a Qatar World Cup Really
Happen?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.si.com/soccer/planet-
futbol/2014/08/01/qatar-world-cup-corruption-heat-rights-concerns (reporting
that Qatar beat U.S. 14 to 8 in last round of votes, despite high-profile advocates
such as former U.S. President Bill Clinton, and noting that Hassan Al-Thawadi,
head of World Cup organizing committee, compares Qatar’s vision to “Steve Jobs’s
in the tech industry and to Detroit’s at the dawn of the automobile age”).
5. See Marissa Payne, FIFA Report on Allegedly Corrupt World Cup Bidding Process
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preparation for the World Cup, such as building a brand new city in
its desert and championing unparalleled solar technology to cool
stadiums for players and fans.6  The Gulf nation seeks to alleviate
critics’ concern for its hot summer weather almost as much as the
nation plans to shine in its cutting-edge modernity.7  Practically
speaking, hosting the World Cup will be quite a feat for a country of
less than two million, the majority of which are non-Qataris.8  In
order to host in 2022, Qatar will rely on the labor of approximately
one million foreign laborers to build the stadiums and infrastruc-
ture necessary to hold the World Cup.9
As Qatar rapidly develops, the bulk of Qatar’s economy rests
on the shoulders of foreign construction workers and domestic ser-
nouncing private release of long-awaited report examining allegations that Qatar
bribed FIFA Executive Committee members).  See generally Paul Rhys, Blatter Reaches
out to Arabia, ALJAZEERA (Apr. 24, 2010 19:09 GMT), http://www.aljazeera.com/
sport/2010/04/ 2010424184010305993.html (quoting FIFA President Sepp Blat-
ter: “The Arabic world deserves a World Cup. They have 22 countries and have not
had any opportunity to organise the tournament.”). See also Qatar 2022: Sepp Blatter
Says Corruption Claims Are Racist, BBC NEWS (June 9, 2014, 17:22 GMT), http://
www.bbc.com/sport/0/football/27762435 (reporting that FIFA president Sepp
Blatter called allegations that Qatar won vote through corruption discriminatory
and racist).  For an overview of the context and investigation of the bribery allega-
tions surrounding Qatar’s election, see infra notes 152-155 and accompanying text. R
6. See Suzy Strutner, Qatar’s New World Cup City Is A Modern Marvel, HUF-
FINGTON POST (Aug. 25, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/
08/25/qatars-new-world-cup-city_n_5698138.html (explaining that plans for new
fourteen-square-mile city include upscale mall, zoo, canal, waterfalls, and two
world-class golf courses); see also Sarah Marsh, Qatar Races to Develop Solar-powered
Cooling for World Cup, REUTERS (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:06 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/
article/2013/04/18/uk-soccer-world-qatar-idUKBRE93H0PC20130418 (discussing
Qatar’s promise to hold carbon-neutral World Cup based on ongoing research and
development of solar-powered cooling technology for its anticipated twelve new
stadiums).
7. See Karen Kaplan, Scientific Proof that a Summer World Cup in Doha Is Too Hot
– for Fans, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2014, 7:30 AM), http://www.latimes.com/science/
sciencenow/la-sci-sn-world-cup-doha-qatar-weather-20140822-story.html (reporting
that team of German researchers advise Qatar to hold World Cup at night or dur-
ing winter); see also Wahl, supra note 4 (“The Qataris saw [the span of twelve years R
before the World Cup] as a chance to propose futuristic projects that they would
have time to complete, including new transportation networks and new stadiums,
some of which would be broken down afterward and sent to developing nations.”).
8. See Mona Chalabi, Qatar’s Migrants: How Have They Changed the Country?,
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 26, 2013, 7:34 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/news/dat-
ablog/2013/sep/26/qatar-migrants-how-changed-the-country (analyzing data that
there are three times more men than women because 70% of population and 94%
of workforce are constituted by migrant workers, who are predominantly male).
9. See Richard Morin, Indentured Servitude in the Persian Gulf, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/sunday-review/indentured-servi-
tude-in-the-persian-gulf.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2&hpw& (“Perhaps a million for-
eign workers are expected to arrive in the next few years to help build nine new
stadiums and $20 billion in roads needed by 2022.”).
2
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vants.10  Yet, the Qatari government seeks ways to decrease its de-
pendence on foreign labor.11  The Gulf nation has created policies
aimed at curbing migrants’ assimilation into the general Qatari
population and has encouraged Qatari nationals to increase their
contribution to the work force.12  In line with this Qatari-centric
policy, labor laws in the country grant substantial control to Qatari
employers, dubbed kafeel, over their foreign employees.13
Most recently, the global soccer community witnessed the
alarming effects of these labor laws with the case of French soccer
player, Zahir Belounis.14  After becoming captain of Qatari team El
Jaish, Belounis’s contract was abruptly terminated, leaving him
without pay.15  Belounis brought legal action against his former
team for unpaid wages and, in retaliation, El Jaish denied his exit
visa.16  Since El Jaish originally sponsored Belounis’s visa as a for-
eign worker, Belounis relied on El Jaish to issue him an exit per-
10. See Chalabi, supra note 8 (examining migrant worker population in R
Qatar’s labor force).
11. See THE STATE OF QATAR’S POPULATION POLICY, THE PERMANENT POPULA-
TION COMMITTEE 9 (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.gsdp.gov.qa/portal/page/
portal/ppc/PPC_home/ppc_news/ppc_files_upload/The%20State%20of%20Qa
tars%20Population%20Policy.pdf (assigning Permanent Population Committee to
formulate Qatar’s “Population Policy” to be reached by 2030, incorporating quan-
titative and qualitative analysis).
12. See id. at 15-37 (setting goals for Qatar’s government, such as promoting
marriage and procreation among Qataris, reducing gender disparity among non-
Qataris by recruiting more female workers, and encouraging balanced distribution
of Qatari workers across sectors).
13. See Morin, supra note 9 (“[A] worker cannot change jobs, leave the coun- R
try, get a driver’s license, rent a home or open a checking account without the
permission of his or her employer-sponsor, or kafeel.  And a kafeel also can with-
draw sponsorship at almost any time and send the employee home.”).
14. See Zahir Belounis, Zahir Belounis: ‘The System in Qatar Is Killing Me.  Please
Speak up’, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2013, 11:19 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
football/2013/nov/14/zahir-belounis-letter-zinedine-zidane-pep-guardiola-qatar
(pleading Qatar World Cup 2022 ambassadors and former star international play-
ers Zinedine Zidane and Pep Guardiola for help leaving Qatar because he has
been living “nightmare” for nearly two years due to kafala exit visa system).
15. See Stefan Simons, Belounis Returns: Footballer Escapes Qatar at Heavy Price,
SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Nov. 29, 2013, 1:29 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/interna-
tional/europe/trapped-french-footballer-belounis-escapes-qatar-at-heavy-price-a-
936330.html (relating story of Belounis’s transfer to Qatar to play for El Jaish, fol-
lowed by early termination of contract and interruption of wages).
16. See Kim Willsher, Zahir Belounis: ‘I Need a Man Who’s Mad Enough to Give Me
a Chance’, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2013, 11:12 EST), http://www.theguardian
.com/football/2013/dec/10/zahir-belounis-interview-english-club (explaining
that Belounis sued El Jaish directors, which includes top members of Qatari gov-
ernment, for breach of five-year contract after club terminated his employment
prematurely and El Jaish refused to grant him exit visa until international outcry
on his case).
3
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mit.17  Under the employer sponsorship system of kafala, Belounis
could not leave the country without his (former) employer’s con-
sent and was left without income for over two years.18  Belounis’s
case brought to the spotlight a common problem for the non-
Qatari workers who make up a majority in Qatar.19  While profes-
sional athletes are not immune to Qatari labor rights infringement,
the majority of migrant workers do not have access to the legal and
financial resources available to the former El Jaish captain to obtain
relief.20 For the most part, the Qatari legal system appears to work
hand-in-hand with employers in restricting workers’ right to due
process.21
17. See Simons, supra note 15 (explaining that El Jaish, owned by Qatari gov-
ernment, required Belounis to waive his suit before issuing exit visa).
18. See Maik Grossekathöfer, Trapped in Qatar: Footballers Describe Nightmarish
Treatment, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Oct. 11, 2013, 11:45 AM), http://www.spie-
gel.de/international/world/foreign-footballers-describe-poor-treatment-in-qatar-a-
926920.html (reporting that Belounis had not been paid monthly salary of $6,692
for twenty-seven months without explanation).
19. See Belounis, supra note 14 (warning “if Qatar does not scrap its “exit visa” R
system, then there will be hundreds, maybe thousands, of people trapped [in
Qatar]”). See also James Montague, Abrupt End to Player’s Misery in Qatar, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/30/sports/soccer/zahir-
belounis-recounts-race-to-the-airport-in-qatar.html?_r=0 (“In response [to the pub-
lic relations crisis following Belounis’s case], the Qatar 2022 Supreme Committee
has published a so-called workers’ charter, which it says will guarantee tough mini-
mum standards on all World Cup construction projects.  FIFA’s president, Sepp
Blatter, has raised the issue of workers’ rights with Qatar’s new emir, and he re-
cently called reports of abuses there unacceptable.”).
20. See Morin, supra note 9 (reporting that most migrant workers begin their R
careers in Qatar in debt, since they find work through recruiting agencies, which
charge near $1000 fees that workers borrow and must work nearly six months to
pay back before making any profit on their salaries).  See also Louise Colcombet &
Geoffroy Tomasovitch, Français retenus au Qatar: deux Juges vont enquêter [French Re-
tained in Qatar: Two Judges Will Investigate], LE PARISIEN (Aug. 28, 2014, 6:49 AM)
(Fr.), http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/video-francais-retenus-au-qatar-deux-
juges-vont-enqueter-28-08-2014-4092325.php (announcing Belounis instigated law-
suit along with two other French expatriates who were denied exit visas against
their former Qatari employers). Nevertheless, Belounis and other players caught
in legal limbo were actively discouraged from seeking FIFA’s help to positively in-
fluence the Qatari authorities. See Qatar Threatens to Use Powerful Hold over FIFA to
Delay French-Moroccan Footballer’s Case, INT’L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION [herein-
after ITUC] (May 29, 2013), http://www.ituc-csi.org/qatar-threatens-to-use-power-
ful (quoting soccer player Ouaddou, who, like Belounis, was denied exit after he
sued his Qatari club, facing intimidation tactics from Qatar and inaction from
FIFA).
21. See World Report 2014: Qatar, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH [hereinafter HRW],
http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/qatar (last visited Sept.
28, 2014) (stating that even when employers deny employees’ right to exit, Interior
Ministry can also impose travel bans on citizens facing civil or criminal claims in
Qatari court).  For examples of difficulties migrant workers face in seeking relief in
Qatari courts, see ITUC infra note 27, at 13, discussing experience of a migrant
worker who spent two years pursuing a damages case in Qatari labor court while,
for support, he relied entirely on charity of friends.
4
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Although FIFA echoed the international support of Belounis
in his case, the soccer organization’s statements with respect to
World Cup workers’ rights abuses are largely out of tune with the
rest of the globe.22  On the international stage, the treatment of
migrant workers has sparked outrage, with organizations such as
Amnesty International calling on FIFA to take responsibility.23  The
Guardian, the leading newspaper that broke the migrant workers’
story, compared the migrant workers’ treatment and living condi-
tions to slavery and trafficking.24  Reporters have condemned the
high rate of fatalities linked with poor working conditions.25  A
Nepalese organization, whose nationals form one sixth of the vast
migrant population in Qatar, have reported 185 Nepalese deaths
while building World Cup infrastructure in 2013 alone.26  At that
rate, an estimated 4,000 migrant workers will die before the launch
of Qatar’s World Cup in 2022.27
22. See Owen Gibson, Qatar Grants Exit Visa to Stranded French Footballer, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 27, 2013, 5:59 EST), http://www.theguardian.com/football/
2013/nov/27/zahir-belounis-french-footballer-qatar-exit-visa (quoting Blatter as
saying that “fair working conditions” must be introduced quickly in Qatar, though
Qatar will host an “amazing World Cup” and was “on the right track” with regard
to workers’ rights, when later faced with detailed reports of abuses called situation
“unacceptable” and insisted “fair working conditions with a lasting effect must be
introduced quickly in Qatar;” shortly afterwards, Blatter blamed European media
for “attacking” Qatar over the issue and claimed the focus on workers’ rights was
“not fair”).
23. Dave Jamieson, Migrant Workers In World Cup Host Qatar ‘Enslaved,’ Living
In Squalor: Report, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 21, 2014 4:28 PM), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/2014/03/21/qatar-migrant-workers_n_5009105.html (reporting
that “[a]n Amnesty representative said FIFA . . . was ‘involved’ in the mess ‘whether
it likes it or not.’”).
24. See Pete Pattisson, Revealed: Qatar’s World Cup ‘Slaves’, THE GUARDIAN (Sept.
25, 2013 12:46 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/25/re-
vealed-qatars-world-cup-slaves (reporting investigation reveals evidence of forced
labor, salaries held up for months to prevent workers from fleeing, confiscation of
passports and refusal to issue identification, denied access to drinking water in
desert heat, and pattern of Nepalese workers seeking refuge in their embassy to
escape abusive work conditions).
25. See Pete Pattisson, Qatar: The Migrant Workers Forced to Work for No Pay in
World Cup Host Country - Video, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 25, 2013 11:41 EDT), http://
www.theguardian.com/global-development/video/2013/sep/25/qatar-migrant-
workers-world-cup-host-video (“Each month dozens of young Nepalese migrant
workers are returning home in coffins.”).
26. See Owen Gibson & Pete Pattisson, Qatar World Cup: 185 Nepalese Died in
2013 – Official Records, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2014 12:00 EST), http://www
.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/24/qatar-2022-world-cup-185-nepalese-work-
ers-died-2013 (reporting numbers of deaths gathered by Nepalese organization
working with families of dead workers and verified by The Guardian show a mini-
mum of 185 Nepalese workers passed in 2013, thirty-six of those after original re-
port by The Guardian sparking global outcry).
27. See ITUC, THE CASE AGAINST QATAR HOST OF FIFA 2022 WORLD CUP 14
(Mar. 2014), available at http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/the_case_against_qatar
5
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Even for an event of the size of the World Cup, this death toll is
alarmingly high; comparatively, Brazil saw a death toll of eight
workers shortly before the start of the 2014 World Cup.28  Following
British media reports, British politicians also demanded FIFA take
action against workers’ deplorable pay and work conditions in
Qatar.29  FIFPro, the largest union of soccer players in the world,
released a statement urging FIFA to closely inspect work sites fol-
lowing allegations of labor violations in preparation for the World
Cup.30  Officials in Qatar echoed the outrage stirred by media re-
ports and promised thorough investigation and improvement, ex-
pressing shock at the deplorable conditions for migrant workers.31
_en_web170314.pdf (citation omitted) (estimating that 4,000 workers would die
before Qatar World Cup, based on current mortality rate reported by Indian and
Nepalese embassies and forecast increase in workers).
28. See Adriana Gomez Licon, Eighth Worker Dies During World Cup Stadium Con-
struction In Brazil, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 8, 2014, available at http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/2014/05/08/world-cup-brazil-worker-dies_n_5290760.html. That
is not to say that working conditions were substantially better in Brazil, as worksite
injuries increased by nearly 6,000 in one World Cup city alone. See, e.g., Ida Karl-
sson, World Cup Workers Struggle for Basic Rights, AL JAZEERA (July 3, 2014, 10:52 AM),
http://www.aljazeera.com/humanrights/2014/07/world-cup-workers-struggle-ba-
sic-rights-2014738261599591.html (“In Sao Paulo, the number of workplace acci-
dents in the construction industry rose from 1,386 in 2012 to 7,133 in 2013.”). But
see Tales Azzoni, Former Labor Slaves, Prisoners Build WCup Venues, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Feb. 22, 2012, available at http://news.yahoo.com/former-labor-slaves-prisoners-
build-141727374.html (reporting that Brazil government used World Cup as re-
entry option for former prisoners and labor slaves).
29. See Robert Booth, FIFA: We Will Monitor Qatar’s Treatment of Migrant World
Cup Workers Closely, THE GUARDIAN (July 30, 2014, 2:16 PM), http://www.theguar-
dian.com/global-development/2014/jul/30/fifa-monitor-qatar-treatment-mi-
grant-world-cup-workers-closely (quoting Nick Raynsford, Labour Party’s former
construction minister as making following statement: “Given the amount of money
being spent on preparations for the World Cup in Qatar it is utterly deplorable
that no one is taking responsibility for the gross exploitation of the workforce in-
cluding shockingly low pay. . . .  It is simply not good enough for Fifa or interna-
tional architects working on these projects to wash their hands and say it is not our
problem”). See also Agencies, Qatar World Cup: Stadium Builders Working in ‘Sub-
human’ Conditions, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 6, 2014, 12:36 PM), http://www.tele-
graph.co.uk/sport/football/10748171/Qatar-World-Cup-Stadium-builders-work-
ing-in-sub-human-conditions.html (quoting English Labour Party Politician Jim
Murphy calling on FIFA to act in the face of “sub-human” conditions faced by
migrant workers).
30. See Qatar Must Uphold Football’s Universal Standards, FIFPRO (Sept. 27,
2013), http://www.fifpro.org/en/news/qatar-must-uphold-football-s-universal-
standards?highlight=WyJxYXRhciIsInFhdGFyJ3MiLCIncWF0YXInIl0= (expressing
concern at “deeply alarm[ing]” reports of migrant workers’ exploitation during
World Cup construction).
31. See Qatar Hits Back at 2022 Slavery Claims, ESPN (Sept. 26, 2013), http://
www.espn.co.uk/football/sport/story/241827.html#1dwgF30cJXB7iiE6.99 (re-
porting Qatar 2022 Supreme Committee was “appalled” by Guardian reports and
will investigate newspaper’s allegations).
6
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol22/iss2/6





      07/27/2015   11:45:39
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-2\VLS206.txt unknown Seq: 7  8-JUL-15 8:41
2015] FIFA’S ROLE IN QATAR’S MIGRANT WORKER ABUSE 629
In a sense, the reports only reawakened Qatar to its failed commit-
ment to prioritize the health and safety of its workers.32
Given the nascent but devastating impact of the World Cup on
non-Qatari migrant workers, this Comment discusses FIFA’s role vis-
à-vis workers’ claims of abusive employment conditions in Qatar.33
In response to the political outcry against the human rights viola-
tions there, FIFA stated that it will closely monitor the working con-
ditions in Qatar.34  At the same time, FIFA President Sepp Blatter
has spoken optimistically about the Qatari government’s disposition
to use the World Cup as an opportunity to achieve social change.35
In addition to evoking the humanitarian urgency to assign responsi-
bility, critics turn to FIFA because of its stated mission to “build a
better future for all through football.”36  Given the nature of this
systemic legal problem, the nature of Qatar’s obligation to the
workers’ needs to be defined.37  Further, it is still to be determined
whether critics of Qatar’s current situation are right to assume that
FIFA can have a lasting impact on Qatar’s labor laws, and that FIFA
is able to tangibly improve labor conditions for migrant workers.38
32. See Wahl, supra note 4 (quoting Al-Thawadi as noting “[t]he safety, secur- R
ity and dignity of every migrant worker—of every person that delivers this World
Cup—are put at the forefront”). For a discussion of Qatar’s initiatives to tackle the
problem of migrant worker abuse, see infra notes 76-77 and 81-82 and accompany-
ing text.
33. Admittedly, the labor concerns are not the only legal issues FIFA has
faced since Qatar won its bid to host the World Cup. See Andy Brown, 2022 World
Cup Qatar: A Convenient Leak?, WORLD SPORTS LAW REPORT (June 3, 2014), http://
www.e-comlaw.com/sportslawblog/template_permalink.asp?id=569 (noting that
FIFA may face “a potential player strike or potential heatstroke deaths.  If it
reschedules the tournament, it faces potential action from European football
leagues due to revenues lost.  In either case, it faces a potential political backlash
over worker conditions, which could involve sponsors, TV companies and support-
ers boycotting the tournament”).
34. See Booth, supra note 29 (reporting FIFA’s commitment following revela- R
tions that workers were paid as little as 45p [approximately $0.72] per hour for
working up to thirty days a month).
35. See FIFA President Meets Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani,
FIFA.COM (July 23, 2014), http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/presi-
dent/news/newsid=2407712/index.html (quoting Blatter as stating the following:
“It was great to see [Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani’s] and Qatar’s com-
mitment to use the 2022 FIFA World Cup to achieve positive social change and to
promote the host country and region. Qatar takes its responsibility as hosts
seriously.”).
36. See MISSION & STATUTES, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisa-
tion/mission.html (last visited Sep. 7, 2014) (naming third pillar of FIFA’s mission
to care about society and environment).
37. See infra notes 102 and 104 and accompanying text for a discussion of R
Qatar’s obligation under international law to improve workers’ conditions.
38. See FIFPRO, supra note 30 (“FIFPro assumes that adherence to FIFA’s prin- R
ciples and international labour standards are conditions on which Qatar was
awarded the extraordinary privilege of hosting football’s greatest event.  FIFA has
7
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Lastly, there is a moral foundation to support FIFA’s responsibility
to take action, but FIFA may also have legal ground to enforce
Qatar’s adherence to its mission, particularly given the develop-
ment of FIFA’s judicial bodies.39
Part II addresses the commitment entailed in hosting a FIFA
World Cup.40  As the world governing organization of soccer, FIFA
heavily regulates the host nation both prior to and during the tour-
nament.41  This Part first takes a closer look at the allegations of
workers’ rights abuse and evaluates Qatar’s response.42  Qatar’s ob-
ligations under the Conventions of the International Labour Or-
ganisation also play a central role in the analysis of enforcement
mechanisms available to increase protections for migrant workers.43
Part II closes with a brief overview of other actors, in addition to
FIFA and Qatar, who have rejected responsibility for the crisis at
hand.44  Part III discusses potential measures to improve labor con-
ditions in Qatar’s World Cup construction projects and prevent fu-
ture violations.45 It explores some of the measures that FIFA has
taken in relation to labor rights improvements in host countries
and in soccer ball production.46  In addition, this Part reviews the
judicial infrastructure FIFA used to address allegations of bribery in
previously acted to ensure international labour standards are respected when it
worked with the International Labour Organisation in the fight against child la-
bour in the manufacture of footballs.  A similar initiative is urgently needed in
Qatar.”).  For a discussion of FIFA’s collaboration with the International Labour
Organisation on the issue of soccer ball child labor, see infra notes 116-120 and
accompanying text.
39. See Robert Booth & Pete Pattisson, Qatar World Cup Stadium Workers Earn as
Little as 45p an Hour, THE GUARDIAN (July 29, 2014, 9:34 EDT), http://www.theguar-
dian.com/global-development/2014/jul/29/qatar-world-cup-stadium-workers-
earn-45p-hour (“The pay rate appears to be in breach of the tournament or-
ganisers’ own worker welfare rules and comes despite the Gulf kingdom spending
£134bn [$215.52 billion] on infrastructure ahead of the competition.”).
40. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (explaining challenge of host- R
ing World Cup).
41. See infra notes 54-62 and accompanying text (analyzing burden of FIFA R
requirements on host country and local population).
42. See infra notes 63-94 and accompanying text (explaining migrant workers’ R
claims, NGO advocacy, measures taken by Qatar to address claims, and NGO dis-
content with Qatari measures).
43. See infra notes 95-109 and accompanying text (discussing extent that ILO R
Conventions and Qatar’s membership in ILO is binding and efforts to hold Qatar
accountable under ILO Constitution).
44. See infra notes 110-120 and accompanying text (narrowing down actors R
who may intervene on behalf of workers or be held accountable).
45. See infra notes 139-148 and accompanying text (discussing ways that FIFA R
can play stronger role enforcing labor rights and providing judicial review).
46. See infra notes 123-127 and accompanying text (discussing soccer ball in- R
dustry).  For a discussion of FIFA’s role in supporting labor protections in Brazil
and South Africa, see sources cited infra notes 128-131 and accompanying text. R
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relation to Qatar’s election as the 2022 World Cup host city.47  Spe-
cifically, Part III examines the strengths and shortcoming of this
infrastructure to provide judicial review of a host country’s failure
to meet a predetermined labor rights threshold.48  Finally, Part III
recommends improvement of FIFA’s internal due process, espe-
cially in light of FIFA’s relative immunity.49
II. LABOR RIGHTS GO TO EXTRA TIME: ASSESSMENT OF WORKERS’
SITUATION AND MEASURES TAKEN TO ADDRESS LABOR CONDITIONS
IN QATAR’S WORLD CUP CONSTRUCTION
“We have plenty of time concerning Qatar but it is 2022, it is in
nine years.”50
A. Hosting the World Cup Is Not a Grassroots Issue
The World Cup is the most followed sports event in the
world.51  Even Qatar, which is one of the richest countries in the
world, stands to benefit from the economic rush of tourists, media
outlets, and world-class athletes that every World Cup attracts.52
Hosting the World Cup has been a substantial boost in public rela-
tions, even for nations undergoing significant human rights chal-
47. For a discussion of judicial infrastructure deployed by FIFA and appellate
review of Court of Arbitration for Sport, see sources cited infra notes 152-166 and R
accompanying text
48. For a review of the judicial critiques surfacing from FIFA’s prosecution
and investigation, see infra notes 173-174 and accompanying text. See also SOCIAL R
RESPONSIBILITY: INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/about-
fifa/socialresponsibility/internationalcooperation.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2014)
(announcing FIFA’s commitment to work with NGOs and to achieve social
change).
49. See Brown, supra note 33 (noting that FIFA will likely face considerable
backlash, including potentially action from clubs if it reschedules World Cup). But
see McCauley, infra note 179 (reporting that clubs will likely request monetary ac- R
commodation to reschedule tournament).  For a discussion of FIFA’s own liability
in connection to a recall of the 2022 votes, see infra 175-179 notes and accompany- R
ing text.
50. See Owen Gibson, World Cup 2022: Football Cannot Ignore Qatar Worker
Deaths, Says Sepp Blatter, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2013, 12:27 PM), http://www
.theguardian.com/football/2013/oct/04/world-cup-2022-fifa-sepp-blatter-qatar-
worker-deaths (quoting FIFA president Sepp Blatter).
51. See Alice Philipson, World Cup 2014: BBC Pulls in Four Times as Many Viewers
as ITV, THE TELEGRAPH (July 14, 2014, 4:12 BST), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
sport/football/world-cup/10966372/World-Cup-2014-BBC-pulls-in-four-times-as-
many-viewers-as-ITV.html (“A record-breaking global audience of around one bil-
lion tuned in to see Germany beat Argentina 1-0.”).
52. See Beth Greenfield, The World’s Richest Countries, FORBES (Feb. 22, 2012,
6:38 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bethgreenfield/2012/02/22/the-worlds-
richest-countries/ (declaring Qatar world’s richest country per capita in 2012 due
to prolific oil and natural gas reserves).
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lenges.53  International sports events have a significant impact on
the social and economic landscape of the host country, prompting
the criticism of human rights focused non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs).54  Host nations often use the World Cup as an op-
portunity to push for greater structural improvements and
economic expansion.55  However, on a local level, the excitement
of the World Cup can quickly cool off in the face of abrupt change,
the alienation of low-income laborers and inhabitants, and an ag-
gressive inflation.56
Popularity does not immunize the World Cup from heavy criti-
cism, especially as FIFA pushes host countries to make drastic struc-
tural changes that can damage the host country’s economic
capacity.57  FIFA standards can also push a government to divert
public funds for the exceptional event, at the expense of local
53. See Tim Vickery, Legacy of South Africa’s World Cup will Take Many Years to
Measure, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.si.com/more-sports/
2010/05/26/worldcup-hosting (referring to Argentina, during its infamous mili-
tary dictatorship, benefitting from public relations campaign of hosting 1978
World Cup); DAVE ZIRIN, BRAZIL’S DANCE WITH THE DEVIL: THE WORLD CUP, THE
OLYMPICS, AND THE FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY 130, (Haymarket 2014) (revisiting his-
tory of brokered victories during World Cup by dictatorships hosting World Cup).
54. See generally Bill Wilson, Fifa World Cup ‘Hits the Poorest Hardest’, BBC NEWS,
(Sept. 7, 2014, 19:00 ET), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28881952 (estimat-
ing burden of Brazil World Cup on public budget between 6.5 and 9.8 Euros,
170,000 lost their homes due to renovations and construction of World Cup infra-
structure, and 75,000 children were evicted from homes for 2014 World Cup and
2016 Olympics construction). See also Tom Phillips, Rio World Cup Demolitions Leave
Favela Families Trapped in Ghost Town, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 2011, 10:57 EDT),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/26/favela-ghost-town-rio-world-
cup (relating destruction of Brazilian community of Favela do Metrô, where home
demolitions to create World Cup infrastructure evicted hundreds of families).
55. See ZIRIN, supra note 53, at 170 (speaking of World Cup as Trojan horse R
for policies that would otherwise be unacceptable due to strain on local popula-
tion, workers, and resources); see also Wahl, supra note 4 (quoting Al-Thawadi R
“[w]e were in the process of significant infrastructure development, and it just
made sense to try to host a major event such as the World Cup because you have a
blank slate, so the infrastructure can be developed to satisfy the needs and require-
ments of the World Cup”).
56. See ZIRIN, supra note 53, at 205-11 (covering widespread protests against R
massive spending of government resources on World Cup instead of addressing
local need).
57. See Andrew Kennis, Brazil, Defeat and the High Cost of Hosting FIFA’s World
Cup, CIP AMERICAS (July 14, 2014), http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/12551
(recounting that FIFA’s requirement that Brazil build twelve stadiums was exces-
sive, too rushed, and caused great frustration among locals requesting more invest-
ment into Brazilian public infrastructures). See also Anna Haslinsky, The Almighty
FIFA and Brazil’s Great Concessions, MOORAD SPORTS L.J. BLOG (July 28, 2014), http:/
/lawweb2009.law.villanova.edu/sportslaw/?p=2637 (discussing pressure on Brazil
to comply with FIFA demands in hosting World Cup).
10
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol22/iss2/6





      07/27/2015   11:45:39
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-2\VLS206.txt unknown Seq: 11  8-JUL-15 8:41
2015] FIFA’S ROLE IN QATAR’S MIGRANT WORKER ABUSE 633
needs and demands.58  The pressure to create the infrastructure of
the magnitude of the World Cup is costly across the board, despite
the vast disparities in local resources across host countries.59  Al-
though FIFA understands its imprint on the host nation’s landscape
as a positive addition, locals often experience FIFA requirements as
extraneous impositions that have little to no regard for the effect
on their community.60  In fact, many citizens would vote against
hosting a major event like the World Cup, if afforded the choice.61
If the World Cup continues to be a fertile source of development,
its fruit is only ripe at the grasstops of the country’s economic
ladder.62
B. An International Wave of Disapproval: Migrant Workers’
Status in Qatar
Migrant workers in Qatar consistently complain that they do
not receive the salary they are promised and sometimes do not re-
ceive any compensation for their work.63  Employers are generally
58. See Kennis, supra note 57 (quoting Brazilian NGO director regarding pro-
tests against Brazilian’s government use of funds to build FIFA-standard stadiums
while raising public transportation costs: “The Brazilian people were demanding to
get public benefits out of the event.  They said they wanted FIFA-standard schools
to be built for Brazilian children, just like the stadiums.”).
59. See ZIRIN, supra note 53, at 147-72 (analyzing similarities of Greece, Ca- R
nada, South Africa, Russia, China, and United Kingdom in struggling to meet de-
mands of FIFA and International Olympics Committee); Ryan Gauthier, Improving
the Bidding Process for International Sporting Events, 1-2 INT’L SPORTS L.J. 3, 3 (2011)
(Neth.), available at http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/20131023T040405-
ISLJ_2011_1-2.pdf (comparing estimated $5.4 billion spent by South Africa for
2010 World Cup, which equals to approximately 1.72% of its gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP), with 3% of South African GDP normally spent on agricultural
industry).
60. See FIFA, FOOTBALL STADIUMS: TECHNICAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND RE-
QUIREMENTS (2004), available at http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/tourna-
ment/competition/football_stadiums_technical_recommendations_and_require
ments_en_8211.pdf (enumerating local benefits of new stadium, such as construc-
tion jobs, tourism, use of stadiums for local recreational programs, or increased
community pride, all of which are meant to enhance locals’ quality of life).
61. See A Chance For a Legitimate 2022 World Cup Host Selection, INT’L SPORTS L.
(June 12, 2014), http://blog.eur.nl/esl/pil/2014/06/12/chance-legitimate-2022-
world-cup-host-selection/ (“Referenda in the past year in Switzerland, Germany,
and Poland, have seen citizens vote against hosting the 2022 Winter Olympic
Games.”).
62. See ZIRIN, supra note 53, at 170 (quoting Jules Boykoff referring to World R
Cup’s impact on host countries as “trickle up economics”).
63. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BUILDING A BETTER WORLD CUP 3 (June 12,
2012) [hereinafter HRW REPORT], available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/
06/12/building-better-world-cup-0 (reporting that workers’ top complaint centers
on different forms of wage theft, including not receiving payment for months, re-
ceiving unsustainable salary that does not match contractual agreement, and arbi-
trary wage deductions).
11
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responsible for providing migrant workers with housing conditions
that meet standards set by local regulations.64  In reality, the gov-
ernment does not closely monitor employers’ compliance with
those regulations.65  After working long hours in extreme heat, mi-
grant construction workers typically live in close quarters and are
required to use unsanitary bathrooms.66  Many workers see their
passports withheld during their employment, in trafficking-like
practices.67 Because they often lose proof of legal status in the
country, migrants working without a passport or workers who fled
abusive conditions are continuously vulnerable.68  Finally, workers
often find themselves trapped in an exploitative system, because
they have to pay back very high recruiting fees, further reducing
their chances of return to their home country, as well as any pros-
pect of profit.69
The plight of migrant workers under the kafala system is far
from unique to Qatar, and echoes throughout other nations in the
United Arab Emirates.70  Arguably, Qatar’s situation demands par-
64. See id. at 3-4 (reporting that regulations require companies not to house
more than four workers in one room, not to use bunk beds, and provide air condi-
tioning and potable water).
65. See ITUC, supra note 27, at 17 (remarking that Qatar’s Supreme Commit- R
tee inspected living conditions of workers working on Al Wakrah stadium only
after ITUC exposed that average of ten or more workers sleep in rooms under
bleachers and in unhygienic facilities).
66. See Worker Deaths Cast Shadow Over Qatar World Cup, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L
(Oct. 1, 2013, 3:51 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/migrant-
workers-dying-in-qatar-ahead-of-2022-world-cup-a-925397.html (recounting stories
of Nepalese workers living and dying in slavery-like conditions in Qatar’s Word
Cup construction sites).
67. See ITUC, supra note 27, at 21 (explaining that even in construction R
projects contracted out for U.S. universities, workers’ passports were withheld due
to widespread practice of forced labor).
68. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE DARK SIDE OF MIGRATION: SPOTLIGHT ON
QATAR’S CONSTRUCTION SECTOR AHEAD OF THE WORLD CUP 103-104 (2013) [herein-
after AI REPORT], available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/the-
dark-side-of-migration-spotlight-on-qatar-s-construction-sector-ahead-of-the-world-
cup (reporting that employers routinely do not return passports to migrants after
obtaining residency permits and hand passports in to Ministry of Interior when
worker complaining that employer breached employment contract); DLA PIPER,
MIGRANT LABOUR IN THE CONSTRUCTION SECTOR IN THE STATE OF QATAR 45-46
(Apr. 2014), available at http://www.engineersagainstpoverty.org/docu-
mentdownload.axd?documentresourceid=58 (reviewing allegation that workers
who actively “abscond” become undocumented residents in Qatar, pushing them
to turn to black market for employment).
69. See Morin, supra note 20 (outlining average debt of workers). R
70. See Nicholas McGeehan, Transnational Crime or State Exploitation? The Traf-
ficking of Migrant Workers to the United Arab Emirates, 26(1) J. IMMIG., ASYLUM & NA-
TIONALITY L. [J.I.A.N.L.] 27, 29 (2012) (Eng.) (describing common predicament
of migrant workers in UAE to include breach of contract by recruiting agencies
and culture of impunity among employers, since existing laws to protect workers
12
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ticular attention, because it hosts more migrants than the rest of
the world.71  The United Nations issued a Special Rapporteur Re-
port urging Qatar not only to reform working conditions for the
World Cup labor force, but also to make sweeping changes to its
labor laws in compliance with international human rights stan-
dards.72  Since the beginning of construction, workers have faced
unprecedented hostility from Qatari authorities.73  The pattern of
labor complaints in the region also shows that exploitation and
abuse are reinforced through the legal system instead of challenged
by that system.74  The Qatari judicial system traditionally has not
been a resource for migrant workers who seek to hold their employ-
ers accountable.75
are scarcely enforced).  “[T]he UAE’s progress on workers’ rights is a fictional
narrative. . . .  The reality is that despite years of criticism and an increased aware-
ness of the problem, the UAE has successfully resisted calls for substantive change
to its labour system.” See id. at 28.
71. See Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias, Top 10 of 2013 – Issue #10: Qatar’s Treatment
of Migrant Workers s Under the Spotlight Ahead of 2022 FIFA World Cup, MIGRATION
POL’Y INSTIT. (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/issue-no-10-
qatars-treatment-migrant-workers-under-spotlight-ahead-2022-fifa-world-cup
(describing Qatar’s labor force as largely dominated by migrant workers, making
Qatar “the world’s highest ratio of immigrants to citizens”); see also AI REPORT,
supra note 68, at 5 (noting that Qatar largely owes growth of nearly twenty new R
people per hour to recruitment of migrant labor).
72. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants,
Addendum – Mission to Qatar, 26th Session of the Human Rights Council, U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/35/Add.1 16 (Apr. 23, 2014) ( by François
Crépeau) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur Addendum], available at http://www
.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/SRMigrants/A-HRC-26-35-Add1_en.pdf (acknowl-
edging pledge of reform and workers’ charter created by Qatari Supreme Commit-
tee but demanding extension and implementation of new principles to all
construction workers).
73. See Marc Bisson, ITUC Blasts Qatar on World Cup Human Rights, WORLD
FOOTBALL INSIDER (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.worldfootballinsider.com/
story.aspx?id=37247 (quoting ITUC president as stating that “[h]undreds of mi-
grant workers, many of them women, are languishing in Doha’s detention centres
simply for running away from abusive and violent employers. Foreign journalists
have been detained for trying to report the truth, and state repression is actually
increasing”).
74. See McGeehan, supra note 70, at 38 (concluding that exploitation of mi- R
grant workers is direct result of laws and does not occur in spite of labor laws).
75. See Sam Badger, et al., Kingdom of Slaves in the Persian Gulf, THE NATION
(Sept. 16, 2014, 11:07 AM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/181626/kingdom-
slaves-persian-gulf# (citing Foreign Domestic Workers in Qatar: Shocking Cases of Decep-
tion, Forced Labour, Violence, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.amnesty
.org/en/news/foreign-domestic-workers-qatar-shocking-cases-deception-forced-la-
bour-violence-2014-04-23) (reporting that Qatari employers who physically or sexu-
ally abuse domestic workers rarely face prosecution or conviction on their crimes).
For a discussion of the systemic obstacles construction workers face to obtain pro-
tection under Qatari law, see infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text. R
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On its face, Qatar takes a proactive approach to address human
trafficking and labor violations, and its Ministry of Labour has the
legal authority to inspect and monitor worksites.76  However, the
reality for most migrants does not reflect this approach, as illus-
trated by the long-standing exploitation of domestic workers.77  On
a practical level, existing laws are not enforced and there is little to
no incentive for Qatari nationals to push for reforming a system of
which they are largely the beneficiaries.78  The nation’s constitution
continues to protect opportunities for the powerful minority of
Qatari citizens.79  The lack of enforcement also fosters poor ac-
countability among the workers’ employers, who do not have to
scrutinize the labor practices on their construction sites.80
Under international pressure, Qatar’s Supreme Committee, re-
sponsible for the 2022 World Cup, revisited its labor laws and
presented reform standards to address the existing issues.81  The
76. See EUR. INST. FOR INT’L L. AND INT’L REL. [EIILIR], 2022 WORLD CUP: COR-
RUPTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (June 17, 2014), available at http://www.eiilir.eu/
global/human-rights/item/340-2022-world-cup-corruption-and-human-rights (re-
porting that in 2010 Qatar launched Arab Initiative for Building National Capaci-
ties for Combating Human Trafficking and that it promotes concrete efforts to
protect labor rights, including providing inspections of labor situation).
77. See ‘My Sleep Is My Break’: Exploitation of Migrant Domestic Workers in Qatar,
AMNESTY INT’L 24 (2014), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/
MDE22/004/2014/en/7b7121b8-37c1-4e49-b1a1-2d8a005450a3/mde220042014
en.pdf 24 (explaining that although Qatar ratified the International Labor Organi-
zation’s Convention 189 in 2011, no specific law substantiates domestic workers’
rights, leaving little to no oversight over private employers’ abuse).
78. See Morin, supra note 9 (“Some 95 percent of Qatari families employ a R
housemaid; more than half have two or more.  A recent survey by the research
institute found that nearly 9 in 10 Qataris did not want to see the kafala system
weakened; if anything, 30 percent said they wanted to see employers’ prerogatives
strengthened.”). See also David Mednicoff, National Security and the Legal Status of
Migrant Workers: Dispatches from the Arabian Gulf, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 121, 130
(2011) (noting that demographic imbalance between local and migrant popula-
tion has fostered xenophobic perceptions of workers as national security and iden-
tity threat).
79. See GIVING GLOBALIZATION A HUMAN FACE, 2008, ILO 6 n.24 (2012), http:/
/www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@relconf/documents/meet-
ingdocument/wcms_174846.pdf (naming Qatar as nation where constitution only
guarantees opportunities for citizens).
80. See Michelle Chen, Qatar Launches Into 2022 World Cup on Backs of Abused
Migrants, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 28, 2013, 12:58 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/michelle-chen/qatar-launches-into-2022-_b_2556016.html (“Labor rights ad-
vocates fear these abuses will only escalate during the lead-up to the World Cup in
the contracted projects of multinational firms. Major construction firms, for exam-
ple, could benefit from the use of subcontractors that can distance big-name devel-
opers from unscrupulous practices on the ground.”).
81. See Montague, supra note 19 (referencing Qatar Supreme Committee’s R
creation of worker charter); Nicholas McGeehan, Dispatches: Qatar’s Labor Reforms
Fall Short, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/
2014/02/11/dispatches-qatar-s-labor-reforms-fall-short (announcing release of Su-
14
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Supreme Committee allocated resources to respond to the urgency
of the migrant laborers’ situation, such as a hotline where people
could report abuses.82  However, NGO critics have little hope that
these standards will address the scale and depth of the problems on
the ground.83  Qatar’s apparent respect for labor and human rights
does not extend to the allocation of needed resources to apply anti-
trafficking measures.84  Although the abuse of workers in the do-
mestic sphere is more prone to lack of enforcement, migrant work-
ers across sectors face deception about the salary and work hours
they are promised, extreme working conditions that include long
hours, and an extreme disadvantage in the unfair sponsorship sys-
tem of kafala.85  Since its inception, the kafala system was meant to
enhance Qatari lives, rather than those of migrants.86  International
NGOs have recognized that it is no coincidence that kafala is the
legal framework that enables slave-like working conditions.87
Additionally, Qatar tasked an international law firm to investi-
gate the claims of migrant worker abuse following viral media ac-
counts.88  The firm issued a report that recommended phasing out
preme Committee’s fifty-page “Workers’ Welfare Standards,” where committee
“outlines how it intends to ensure the basic rights of foreign migrant workers in-
volved in select projects related to the construction of stadiums and associated
infrastructure”).
82. See ITUC, supra note 27, at 19 (announcing that standards provide for R
hotline for worker complaints). But see id. (noting that Committee’s hotline has
been complete failure and did not work when ITUC called it).
83. See McGeehan, supra note 81 (“The new standards don’t ensure a worker’s R
rights to change employers, leave the country, or bargain collectively for better pay
and conditions . . . the standards will impact only a small fraction of migrant work-
ers . . . . Qatar’s labor system needs a major overhaul, not a minor makeover.”).
84. See ITUC, supra note 27, at 28 (citing U.S. Department of State as report- R
ing that “[d]espite the passage of the new anti-trafficking law in 2011 and ex-
isting laws that could be used to punish trafficking offenders, the government did
not report any clear efforts to investigate, prosecute, or punish trafficking offenses
during the reporting period.”).
85. See AI REPORT, supra note 68, at 6 (summarizing abuse faced by migrants). R
86. See Morin, supra note 9 (“Developed in the late 1950s in sparsely popu- R
lated Persian Gulf states that needed workers for their oil and gas industries, the
[kafala] system has expanded to the point where there are nearly five foreign
workers for each Qatari citizen.”).
87. See AI REPORT, supra note 68, at 54 (“[T]he so-called visa [kafala] sys- R
tem . . . in certain countries in the Middle East may be conducive to the exaction
of forced labour.” (quoting INTERNATIONAL LABOUR EXPERT COMMITTEE, 101st Ses-
sion, 2012: General Survey on the Fundamental Conventions Concerning Rights at Work in
Light of the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization (2008), available at
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@relconf/documents/
meetingdocument/wcms_174846.pdf)).
88. See Nicholas McGeehan, Qatar Report on Migrant Workers Criticizes Treatment
of Workers, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 14, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/print/
news/2014/05/14/qatar-report-migrant-workers-criticizes-treatment-workers (an-
15
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the use of the kafala system, which was no longer an “appropriate
tool” to regulate migration.89  Following this report, Qatar has
promised to reform its labor laws, including its controversial exit
visa system.90  While applauding this apparent opposition to the
controversial law, NGOs express two important concerns: first, on
what comes next, and second, on the firm’s gradual approach.91
Although Qatar invited NGO observers to investigate concerns, the
firm’s report and media coverage have not resulted in substantial
reform or betterment of migrant workers’ conditions.92  It is also
relevant to note that the Gulf nation’s investigation is not
equivalent to plain transparency.93  Frustrated that Qatar does not
substantiate its promises for reform, the ITUC has rejected Qatar’s
claim of improvements and continued concern regarding the status
of migrant workers.94
nouncing that Qatar appointed DLA Piper to examine the claims brought up by
the Guardian [see Pattisson, supra notes 24-25] and subsequent media outlets).
89. See DLA PIPER, supra note 68, at 44 (confirming based on review that R
kafala is no longer appropriate regulatory tool, due to “potential detrimental ef-
fect”); see also id. at 9 (recommending phasing out of exit visa system because too
prone to abuse).
90. See Ian Black, Qatar Promises to Reform Labour Laws After Outcry Over ‘World
Cup Slaves’, THE GUARDIAN, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/14/
qatar-reform-labout-laws-outcry-world-cup-slaves (quoting Colonel Abdullah Saqr
al-Mohannadi, human rights director of the Qatari interior ministry: “We are go-
ing to abolish the kafala system and it will move to the legislative institutions”).
91. See McGeehan, supra note 81 (noting that despite firm’s recommenda- R
tions, Qatari government has not specified action steps following report’s findings
and criticizes report for not sanctioning immediate abolition of kafala).  Human
Rights Watch also alleges that kafala is a blatant violation of international law on
the right to depart from a country. Id.
92. See id. (acknowledging that rest of United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia
refuse to let in human rights groups to investigate similar allegations). See also The
Middle East’s Migrant Workers: Forget about Rights, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 10, 2013,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/21583291/ (outlining pervasive use
of kafala in Saudi Arabia and UAE).
93. Recently, Qatar arrested two British researchers investigating allegations
of labor violations. See World Cup ‘Slaves’ Scandal: Qatar Holds 2 UK Rights Researchers
Over ‘Emigration Violations’, RT (Sept. 7, 2014, 15:01), http://rt.com/news/185780-
qatar-world-cup-workers/ (quoting Qatari government statement that arrests were
“consistent with principles of human rights enshrined in the constitution” and that
researchers are “being interrogated” and detained following their investigation of
“violations” of emigration laws).  This was not the first time that Qatari authorities
arrested foreigners visiting for the purpose of investigating workers’ human rights
abuses. See German Filmmaker Imprisoned for Exposing Dire Qatar World Cup Worker
Conditions, RT (Oct. 16, 2013, 17:03), http://rt.com/news/qatar-german-cup-work-
ers-265/ (reporting that German filmmaker was arrested in Qatar and confiscated
equipment after he interviewed migrant workers from Nepalese embassy).
94. See ITUC, supra note 27, at 16-20 (recounting disappointment after Qatar R
released two charters promising reform and claimed cooperation with ITUC while
stalling to make needed systemic changes, e.g., end of kafala system, implement
16
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C. Bend it Like Qatar: The Impact of International Labour
Organization Conventions
Qatar is a member of the International Labour Organization
(ILO), whose purpose is to enhance labor conditions for workers
around the world.95  Although the ILO preceded the United Na-
tions (UN), it became a specialized agency of the UN in 1946.96
Under its Constitution, the ILO included provisions allowing it to
institute legal proceedings against its member states.97  The ILO
also has a supervisory system that monitors the implementations of
various conventions member governments ratify.98  Conventions
cover a wide range of labor issues faced by workers around the
world, including minimum wage issues, forced labor, limitations on
hours of work, protections for migrant workers, and collective bar-
gaining rights.99  Qatar has ratified several ILO Conventions since
1976.100  However, Qatar has not substantially incorporated the
Convention’s principles into its legislative mandates.101
minimum wage and effective grievance system, and grant foreign workers collec-
tive bargaining rights).
95. See Mission and Objectives, ILO: INT’L LABOUR ORG. (last visited Sept. 5,
2014), http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/history/lang—en/index.htm (ex-
plaining that ILO seeks to enhance opportunities and protections for “decent em-
ployment and income” around the world). See also HRW Report, supra note 63, at R
91-92 (noting that Qatar is ILO member since 1972).
96. See Origins and History, ILO: INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/
global/about-the-ilo/history/lang—en/index.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2014) (ex-
plaining origins of ILO).
97. See Constitution, Article 39, ILO: INT’L LABOUR ORG. (last visited Sept. 29,
2014), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_
ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO#A39 (explaining legal status of organization).
98. See ILO Supervisory System/Mechanism, ILO: INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://
www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo-works/ilo-supervisory-system-mecha-
nism/lang—en/index.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2014) (explaining that first mem-
ber states who do not implement conventions are encouraged to do so through
dialogue and technical assistance, followed by special procedures such as legal
proceedings).
99. See Conventions, ILO: INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/dyn/nor-
mlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12000:0::NO::: (last visited Sept. 29, 2014) (listing
ILO Conventions).
100. See Ratifications for Qatar, ILO: INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/
dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:103429
(last visited Sept. 6, 2014) (listing Qatar’s ratification of 6 conventions, namely the
Forced Labour Convention, the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention, Discrimi-
nation, the Minimum Age Convention, Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention,
and Labour Inspection Convention).  Although there are 71 conventions that
Qatar has not ratified, including those addressing minimum wage and collective
bargaining, Qatar’s ratification of ILO Conventions on forced labor and labor in-
spections are particularly relevant in the instant case. See id.
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In September 2012, the International Trade Union Confedera-
tion (ITUC) launched a formal complaint against Qatar to the ILO
to curb the ongoing death toll and workers’ rights abuse in
Qatar.102  Qatar was called in to respond to allegations that it did
not implement ILO Conventions, including ones that it did not rat-
ify, because of its obligation as a member of the ILO.103  One year
later, Qatar responded by calling the complaint “malicious” and po-
litical, suspecting a covert goal to “undermine the reputation of the
State as it prepares to host the World Cup.”104  The ILO adjudi-
cated the ITUC complaint by providing recommendations and con-
demned Qatar’s failure to pass substantive labor reform to address
the pressing needs of migrant workers.105
If Qatar fails to follow the ILO’s recommendations, the ILO
may establish a “Commission of Inquiry.”106  Even when such Com-
mission is established, their investigation is presented in the form of
Chapter/Article%5B@Number=19%5D (last visited Sept. 6, 2014) (“each of the
Members undertakes that it will, within the period of one year at most from the
closing of the session of the Conference, or if it is impossible owing to exceptional
circumstances to do so within the period of one year, then at the earliest practica-
ble moment and in no case later than 18 months from the closing of the session of
the Conference, bring the Convention before the authority or authorities within
whose competence the matter lies, for the enactment of legislation or other
action”).
102. See INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, 371ST REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM
OF ASSOCIATION 225, (Mar. 13-27, 2014), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/—-ed_norm/—-relconf/documents/meetingdocument/
wcms_239692.pdf (alleging restrictions on workers rights, collective bargaining,
strikes, and excessive Qatari control of trade union activities).
103. See Article 19 Conventions and Recommendations supra note 101. See R
also Dustin Williamson, Comment, Part of the Team: Building Closer Relationships Be-
tween MLB Teams and Independent Agents in the Dominican Republic Through an MLB
Code of Conduct, 2 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 369, 388 (2013) (“Whether or
not a country has ratified the conventions underlying the fundamental rights, they
‘have an obligation arising from the very fact of membership in the Organization
to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and in accordance with the
Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the sub-
ject of those Conventions.’” (citing ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work and its Follow-up, ¶ 2, ILO (adopted June 18, 1998 (Annex revised
June 15, 2010)), available at http://ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdecla
ration/lang—en/index.htm)).
104. See INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 102, at 228 (transcribing Qatari gov- R
ernment’s response to ITUC complaint).
105. See id. at 237 (urging and requesting Qatar to “initiate without delay a
labour reform . . . based on the principles [of freedom of association]”).
106. See Complaints, ILO: INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/stan-
dards/applying-and-promoting-international-labour-standards/complaints/lang—
en/index.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2014) (explaining that ILO established eleven
Commissions of Inquiry for any member “accused of committing persistent and
serious violations and has repeatedly refused to address them”).
18
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instructions to the country in violation.107  Although the ILO pro-
vides heightened scrutiny with increase disrespect of its recommen-
dations, there is no clear penalty that nations incur by violating the
ILO Constitution or failing to enforce Conventions.108  Absent an
enforcement mechanism on the part of the ILO and the interna-
tional community, Qatar’s violation of ILO convention does not
have tangible consequences in international law.109
D. Dropping the Ball on Workers’ Rights
Regardless of the host nation’s location, the soccer world’s gov-
erning body is rooted in the center of Western Europe and subject
to Swiss law.110  The migrant workers crisis is therefore propitious to
generate a European response, with European politicians joining
the media in condemning migrant workers’ conditions.111  How-
ever, there is little hope that European lawmakers will intervene to
hold the Gulf nation accountable, either through sanctions or the
exertion of significant diplomatic pressure.112  European countries’
107. See id. (noting that Commission of Inquiry in Myanmar found “wide-
spread and systematic” forced labor); REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY TO
EXAMINE THE OBSERVANCE BY MYANMAR OF THE FORCED LABOUR CONVENTION, 1930
(NO. 29), ILO, available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEX
PUB:50012:0::NO::P50012_COMPLAINT_PROCEDURE_ID,P50012_LANG_
CODE:2508280,en (last visited Sept. 29, 2014) (making investigatory finding of
forced labor in Myanmar).
108. See Developments in the Law—Jobs and Borders: Legal Tools for Altering
Labor Conditions Abroad, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2208 (2005) (noting that without en-
forcement mechanism, there is little incentive for countries to implement
measures).
109. See id. at 2202, 2207 (explaining that ILO relies on techniques such as
persuasion, publicity, shame, or diplomacy for lack of real enforcement powers).
110. See THE ORGANIZATION, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisa-
tion/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2014) (explaining that FIFA falls under Swiss jurisdiction
since its founding in 1904).
111. See Booth, supra note 29 (quoting British Labour Party representative on R
Qatar and architectural firms’ refusal to take responsibility).  FIFA Executive Com-
mittee member Theo Zwanziger has also explicitly called on Europe to get more
involved, suggesting that European politicians can have a strong influence on the
Qatari Emir, who has close ties with Europe. See Mirjam Gehrke, Zwanziger: Politi-
cians ‘Need to get Involved’ in Qatar, DW (Feb. 15, 2014), http://www.dw.de/
zwanziger-politicians-need-to-get-involved-in-qatar/a-17435601 (reporting Theo
Zwanziger as stating the following: “[FIFA] expect[s] involvement from politicians.
European countries and the EU can’t just stand on the sidelines and let FIFA carry
all the responsibility.”).
112. See Mirjam Gehrke, FIFA: Stripping Qatar of 2022 World Cup ‘Counterproduc-
tive’, DW (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.dw.de/fifa-stripping-qatar-of-2022-world-cup-
counterproductive/a-17428662 (explaining that although European Commission
on Human Rights support change in Qatar’s legal system, no sanctions or mea-
sures are on the table due to stagnant political situation). See also Grossekathöfer,
supra note 14 (noting that Belounis had 20-minute conversation with French Presi-
19
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economic interests too often come into conflict with the interests of
promoting human rights.113
Further, European courts traditionally do not exercise over-
sight over international sports organizations.114  In the absence of
government oversight, plaintiffs often turn to the organization’s
own judicial process because they do not have standing to pursue
claims in external courts.115  Calls to create an independent labor
court to address claims outside of host countries and international
sports organizations have been mostly ignored.116
This inaction is particularly problematic since migrant workers
in Qatar often cannot pursue claims against their private employ-
ers.117  Different parties associated with the construction projects
have also denied liability with respect to migrant workers’ condi-
tions.118  Meanwhile, the accelerating rise in land price can aggra-
dent François Hollande who promised to help stranded soccer player but Presi-
dent did not improve Belounis’s situation).
113. See The Alarming Situation of Human Rights in Qatar, EIILIR: EUR. INST. FOR
INT’L L. & INT’L REL. (June 12, 2014), http://www.eiilir.eu/global/human-rights/
item/339-the-alarming-situation-of-human-rights-in-qatar (“For countries such as
France which have traditionally pointed out the importance of respect of civil
rights, the economic interests have overshadowed the concern for Human Rights.
Qatar has invested billions of dollars in the Republic, but France failed to apply
pressure on Qatar to abide by international regulations.”).
114. See Alexander Wynn, Red Card Racism: Using the Court of Arbitration For
Sport (CAS) to Prevent and Punish Racist Conduct Perpetrated by Fans Attending European
Soccer Games, 13 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 313, 331 (2011) (“Case law from the
European Court of Justice . . . reflects the E.U.’s and European Commission’s pol-
icy of allowing sports organizations to govern their own affairs.”).
115. See James A. R. Nafziger, International Sports Law: A Replay of Characteristics
and Trends, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 489, 509 (1992) (“Courts . . . have traditionally de-
nied standing to plaintiffs or otherwise dismissed actions on grounds of admissibil-
ity.  Typically the results and quite often the court’s explicit rationale have involved
deference to sports organizations to apply their own principles and rules or those
of national federations.”).
116. See ITUC, supra note 27, at 19 (offering as solution creation of courts to
provide effective platform for workers’ complaints).
117. See id. at 13 (relating experience of migrant worker who brought case in
Qatari labor court for two years for damages, during which worker had to rely on
charity of friends to support himself because both of expense of litigation and
inability to work).
118. See Joanna Walters, Zaha Hadid Suing New York Review of Books over Qatar
Criticism, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/artand-
design/2014/aug/25/zaha-hadid-suing-qatar-article-2022-world-cup (reporting
that architect who designed World Cup stadiums for Qatar 2022 is suing New York
Review of Books for defamation because of comments that associated her with
workers’ crisis, although architects “have nothing to do with the workers”).  CH2M
HILL, the US company appointed to deliver construction for the 2022 World Cup,
has also denied liability for allegations of labor rights violations. See Jeff Mac-
Gregor, Human Rights Issue Raised in Qatar, ESPN (Oct. 1, 2013, 6:35 PM), http://
espn.go.com/espn/story/_/id/9753901/human-rights-concerns-raised-qatar-
world-cup (providing html link to PDF of correspondence between ESPN and
20
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vate the financial pressure on development projects and
construction companies and damage workers’ chances to receive
fair compensation.119  Other than the Qatari government, the only
remaining actor able and expected to take responsibility is FIFA.120
III. TURNING TO FIFA TO TACKLE RESPONSIBILITY
“If FIFA demand Qatar abolish kafala and respect fundamental
international rights, it will happen.”121
A. From Soccer Balls to World Cup Stadiums: Getting to Labor
Issues before the Final Whistle
Although the 2022 World Cup bolstered a conversation over
migrant laborers’ rights due to Qatar’s unique demographics, this is
not the first time that FIFA was prompted to take action on local
labor issues.122  In the past, FIFA has taken an active stance against
child labor in the production of soccer balls.123  In that context,
similar to the labor issues in Qatar, media outlets acted as a catalyst
for reform and awareness.124  In addition to monetary contribu-
tions, FIFA translated its commitment to avoiding child labor into a
CH2M HILL and announcing that CH2M HILL has no “input into the terms and
conditions of employment of a contractor’s labor force on this project.”).  Mr.
MacGregor discusses his email correspondence with CH2M HILL as well as the
company’s response to articles by The Guardian and provides that a PDF docu-
ment copy of that correspondence may be found at the following web address:
http://a.espncdn.com/pdf/2013/1001/email.pdf. See id.
119. See Ebrahim Omar, Qatar Land Prices Rise Significantly: Experts, EURASIA
REVIEW (Apr. 19, 2014), http://www.eurasiareview.com/19042014-qatar-land-
prices-rise-significantly/ (estimating cost of land to have increased by 500% since
2010, in part due to World Cup 2022 construction projects).
120. See ITUC, supra note 27, passim (calling FIFA to demand that Qatar abol- R
ish kafala).
121. See ITUC, supra note 27, at 5. R
122. Although FIFA’s position on labor rights was most covered in the cam-
paign against child labor for soccer balls in the 1990s, there are also recent exam-
ples of the organization’s continued involvement with the ILO and construction
workers’ rights. See sources cited infra notes 128-132 and accompanying text (ex- R
amining of FIFA’s direct involvement with labor unions in Brazil and South Af-
rica’s World Cups in 2010 and 2014).
123. See SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/
socialresponsibility/news/newsid=102476/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2014) (noting that
FIFA worked in collaboration with the ILO, trade unions, and NGOs to combat
child labor in the “Elimination of Child Labour in the Soccer Ball Industry” pro-
gram); see also ILO, From Stitching to Playing: Sialkot Ten Years After, ILO: INT’L LA-
BOUR ORG. (July 7, 2006), http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/
features/WCMS_071247/lang—en/index.htm (reporting that ILO and FIFA or-
ganized soccer matches for former child laborers in Pakistan).
124. See INT’L LABOR RIGHTS FORUM [hereinafter ILRF], MISSED THE GOAL FOR
WORKERS: THE REALITY OF SOCCER BALL STITCHERS IN PAKISTAN, INDIA, CHINA AND
THAILAND 2 (June 7, 2010), available at https://archive.cleanclothes.org/re-
21
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statute governing the organization.125  In fact, FIFA’s commitment
to improve labor conditions in the soccer ball industry went beyond
consideration of child labor alone, breaking new ground for collec-
tive bargaining rights and workers’ safety.126  Ultimately, FIFA’s pro-
position was selectively adopted, with a narrow focus on curbing
child labor; but the outcome remains a fruitful locus of collabora-
tion between FIFA and the ILO on labor issues.127
FIFA also had a productive experience working with trade un-
ions in anticipation of the South African World Cup in 2010.128
With the help of international trade unions such as the Building &
Woodworkers International (BWI), South African trade unions
managed to get FIFA on board with significant commitments for
labor standards in construction sites for the 2010 World Cup.129  Af-
ter numerous strikes, local union members and BWI met with FIFA,
and FIFA promised to take the workers’ demands to the South Afri-
can government, ultimately resulting in numerous inspections from
union representatives to ensure continued attention to workers’
sources/recommended/missed-the-goal-for-workers (contextualizing reform of
child labor practices as response to media frenzy and public outrage).
125. See David M. Trubek, Jim Mosher & Jeffrey S. Rothstein, Transnationalism
in the Regulation of Labor Relations: International Regimes and Transnational Advocacy
Networks, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1187, 1198 (2000) (noting FIFA’s ban on child labor
and requirement of “fair wages” and respect for workers’ rights to join unions in
soccer ball industry).  FIFA’s move even put pressure on U.S. apparel manufactur-
ers to follow suit. Id.
126. See ILRF, supra note 124, at 4-5 (discussing FIFA’s collaboration with ILO R
to produce Code of Labor Practice prohibited use of child labor, guaranteed col-
lective bargaining rights, stressed fair and safe working conditions).
127. See id. (noting that World Federation of Sporting Goods Industries re-
jected FIFA code and adopted new code in 1997, which only focused on child
labor).  As a result of this narrow focus, consumers who buy balls that bear a seal
guaranteeing that the ball was not produced by child labor may also indirectly
support other nefarious labor practices. See id. at 26 (suggesting child-labor-free
balls may also be produced through workers receiving poverty wages and which are
inhibited from forming trade unions).
128. See FIFA President Blatter Sides with South African Stadium Builders, ASSOCI-
ATED PRESS, Mar. 11, 2008, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/
soccer/2008-03-11-3456248718_x.htm (reporting that Blatter made several visits to
stadium construction sites before South African World Cup and supported unions’
claims to fair treatment).
129. See EDIE COTTLE & MAURICIO ROMBALDI, LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA’S
FIFA WORLD CUP, BRAZIL AND ITS LEGACY FOR LABOUR 8-9, available at http://www
.global-labour-university.org/fileadmin/Summer_School_2014/EddieCottleCE-
TIMbook2013FINAL.pdf (relating South African and international unions’ suc-
cessful trade union campaign leading up to 2010 World Cup, despite FIFA’s lack of
support).  Although FIFA was initially reluctant to grant unions inspections of con-
struction sites, it ultimately released a statement to support the unions. See id. at 9
(quoting Vasco Pedrina & Joachim Merz, The Trade Union Legacy of the 2010 World
Cup: International Solidarity Revitalised, in SOUTH AFRICA’S WORLD CUP: A LEGACY FOR
WHOM? 201 (Eddie Cottle, ed., 2011)).
22
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conditions.130  BWI’s success in lobbying FIFA to have an impact on
the workers’ lives created a momentum where workers’ rights will
continue to be at the forefront of future World Cup organizing.131
Effectively, workers had better protections in the following World
Cup in Brazil, where collective bargaining allowed wage increases
and improved health and safety conditions.132
Unlike South Africa or Brazil, no local union in Qatar has pres-
sured FIFA to implement protections for migrant workers because
Qatari law prohibits them from organizing.133  As a result, FIFA is
taking no responsibility for labor violations in Qatar, even in the
face of strong criticism of the human rights standards that are fail-
ing to be met in Qatar.134  Despite the gravity of the allegations,
even major NGOs shy away from requesting FIFA to use similar di-
rect measures as in recent World Cups to address the workers’ de-
mands and conditions.135  Conversely, FIFA resists allegations that it
130. See BUILDING & WOOD WORKERS INT’L AND LABOUR RESEARCH SERVICE
[hereinafter BWI], FAIR GAMES, FAIR PLAY: EVALUATION OF THE BUILDING & WOOD
WORKERS INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR DECENT WORK TOWARDS AND BEYOND 2010
19 (2007), available at http://www.bwint.org/pdfs/bwi%20external%20report%20
final%20small.pdf (noting that FIFA ultimately held its promise to inspect sites
with union leaders).
131. See id. at 20 (concluding that South Africa’s model can serve as prece-
dent to “extract firmer commitments” from FIFA). See also HRW REPORT, supra
note 63, at 34 (explaining launch of “decent work” campaign by trade unions in R
October 2007, promoting stronger labor rights).
132. See HRW REPORT, supra note 63, at 7 (contrasting inherent obstacle in R
Qatari law and local laws in South Africa and Brazil that enabled construction
workers to organize and make successful demands); see also BUILDING & WOOD
WORKERS INT’L, SOUTH AFRICA HANDS OVER DECENT WORK CAMPAIGN TO BRAZIL
(May 27, 2010), http://www.bwint.org/default.asp?Index=2748&Language=EN
(announcing that Brazilian trade union will continue Campaign for Decent Work
initiated in South Africa).
133. See ITUC, COUNTRIES AT RISK: 2013 REPORT ON VIOLATIONS OF TRADE
UNION RIGHTS 72 (2013), available at http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/sur-
vey_ra_2013_eng_final.pdf (explaining that non-Qataris do not have right to
unionize, excluding over 90% of the workforce from right to organize).  Even if
migrant workers were allowed to organize, the ITUC reports that they would need
to be part of companies that employ a minimum of one hundred Qatari workers.
Id.  However, that is not to say that South African workers’ rights to organize do
not face significant challenges.  In the same year as the World Cup, the ITUC
reported that South African trade unions’ protesters were at times faced with live
bullets from the authorities. See Press Release, Difficult to Be a Trade Unionist in
Africa, ITUC (June 1, 2011), http://www.ituc-csi.org/press-release-difficult-to-be-
a?lang=en.
134. See EIILIR, supra note 76 (“European Parliament called FIFA to pay at- R
tention to the situation.  The President of FIFA Joseph S. Blatter told [sic] that
FIFA will pay attention to the situation in Qatar. . . .  FIFA stressed that it is Qatar
who is responsible together with companies who employs [sic] workers”).
135. HRW REPORT, supra note 63, at 91-92. The HRW Report outlined the R
following bulleted list of recommendations for FIFA:
To FIFA
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claims confuse its marginal role in the scandal with the Qatari legis-
lative power.136  Unlike many NGOs, the ITUC challenges FIFA to
use its role in the controversy as an opportunity to inject change
into Qatar’s entire labor laws.137  The ITUC even asked FIFA to de-
• Call upon Qatari partners organizing the World Cup to obtain writ-
ten commitments from developers, partners, contractors, subcontrac-
tors and their affiliates involved in the construction of World Cup
facilities and supporting infrastructure that they will engage in socially
responsible recruitment and employment practices, in accordance with
the protections of international labor laws, as detailed in the recom-
mendations to contractors, below.;
• In particular, follow up on the commitment by the Supreme Com-
mittee for Qatar 2022 to incorporate contractual provisions guarantee-
ing respect for international labor standards, and encourage that such
provisions be comprehensive, enforceable and in line with internation-
ally recognized labor rights;
• Consistent with FIFA’s public commitment to engage with Qatari au-
thorities on labor rights matters, formally raise with the Qatari govern-
ment key workers’ issues, including recruitment fees that workers pay
and inadequate implementation of laws meant to prohibit workers
from being charged such fees, restrictions that ban or effectively pro-
hibit workers from free association, collective bargaining, and strikes,
and Sponsorship Law provisions that keep workers from changing jobs
or leaving the country without their employer’s permission. Seek con-
crete commitments for legal reform on these issues;
• Request immediate and full disclosure of labor disputes, workplace
injuries, and deaths on construction sites for venues of the 2022 World
Cup;
• Seek independent verification that all workers employed to construct
venues for the 2022 World Cup have not been the victims of wage ex-
ploitation and other abuses;
• Make public the guarantees and protections sought and obtained to
protect the rights of workers in Qatar, to reassure the Qatari and inter-
national public that the World Cup 2022 will not be tainted by the
currently prevalent practices of migrant worker abuse;
• Finance a public awareness campaign using mainstream media to
raise consciousness about trafficking and labor exploitation, and to ed-
ucate companies, countries, and football fans to these issues.
Id.
136. See Ian Traynor, Fifa Says There Is Little it Can Do about Labour Conditions in
Qatar, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2014, 11:33 EST), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/feb/13/fifa-labour-conditions-qatar-world-cup (quoting member of
FIFA executive Theo Zwanzinger “[t]his feudal system existed [in Qatar] before
the World Cup . . . . What do you expect of a football organisation? Fifa is not the
lawmaker in Qatar”); see also AP Worldstream, supra note 128 (quoting Blatter re- R
garding South African union workers’ claims: “FIFA is not the employer or the
builder responsible for constructing the stadiums”).
137. See International Unions Set Conditions on Qatar World Cup, ITUC (May 19,
2014), http://www.ituc-csi.org/international-unions-set (demanding that Qatar al-
low freedom of association and collective bargaining, minimum wage for all work-
ers, introduce grievance procedures, work with responsible international
recruitment agencies).
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mand that Qatar end the kafala system as a condition to its hosting
privileges in 2022.138
Arguably, FIFA already stepped beyond its role as a soccer gov-
erning body by articulating a plethora of invasive demands for host
countries—including the constitution of ad hoc courts to police
World Cup games.139  For an international sporting event of the
magnitude of the World Cup, lasting imprints on a host country’s
legal system are not out of the question.140  The latest World Cup in
Brazil showed that FIFA can successfully demand legal changes to
the host country’s body of laws.141  Prior to the 2014 World Cup,
FIFA amended Brazilian federal law to allow the sale and consump-
tion of alcohol in stadiums, assigning all civil liability that may en-
sue to Brazil.142  As evidenced in Brazil, special labor regulations
138. See ITUC, supra note 27, at 5 (“Qatar must change.  FIFA can make a R
difference by making the abolishment of kafala and the respect of international
rights a condition of Qatar hosting the World Cup in 2022.  If FIFA demand Qatar
abolish kafala and respect fundamental international rights, it will happen.”).
139. See Rob Hughes, Swift and Severe Justice at World Cup Courts, N.Y. TIMES
(June 20, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/21/sports/soccer/21iht-wc-
soccer.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (reporting that FIFA took over 56 courts in
South Africa’s 2010 World Cup to relieve sponsors from concerns about high
crime rates in host country).  In South Africa, the government paid the price of
the unprecedented judicial changes that FIFA required, in order to boost security
at World Cup games. See Mike Pesca, South Africa’s World Cup Court: Sudden Justice,
NPR (June 22, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=128012634 (noting that South African government paid $6 mil-
lion to create FIFA’s ad hoc courts). Interestingly, FIFA or its ad hoc South African
courts did not seek to address demands of workers alleging abusive wages and
working conditions, reverting back to local authorities’ discretion. See id.
(“[W]orkers claimed that they were offered 126 to 190 rand [approximately $11-
17] for shifts up to 15 hours, and that on night games they had no transport to get
home and slept in bus shelters or police stations in freezing conditions.  FIFA dis-
claimed responsibility for the problems and welcomed a police takeover of the
security role.”).
140. See Matthew J. Mitten & Hayden Opie, Sports Law”: Implications for the
Development of International, Comparative, and National Law and Global Dispute Resolu-
tion, 85 TUL. L. REV. 269, 315, 317 (2010) (“[T]he rules and commercial arrange-
ments of international and Olympic sports possess a unique capacity to spread
legal norms worldwide because of the growing importance of international sports
competition. . . .  As major international sporting events move around the globe,
they often leave a legacy of intellectual property reform and related legal develop-
ments, which may be specific to the event or sports organization or perhaps have
wider relevance.” (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted)).
141. See Daniel De Saulles, How FIFA Is Changing Brazil’s Constitution for the
World Cup, LAWYER 2B (June 7, 2014), http://l2b.thelawyer.com/home/insight/
how-fifa-is-changing-brazils-constitution-for-the-world-cup/3020589.article (ex-
plaining that FIFA alleviated concern of major sponsor Budweiser by changing
Brazil’s ban on alcohol in stadiums).
142. See id. (explaining that “Brazilian Federal Statute n.10.671 of 2003 . . .
prohibit[ed]  the entry and sale of alcoholic beverages inside stadiums during foot-
ball matches . . . . [but] Law 12.663/2012 – the ‘World Cup Law’ – which came
into effect in June 2012, [was] [ ] amended . . . . opening the way for sale of
25
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are also not outside of the scope of conditions that FIFA may im-
pose on a host country.143  FIFA’s “World Cup Law” in Brazil did
not reflect a progressive take on workers’ rights from the FIFA lead-
ership.144  Consistent with some of the government guarantees
FIFA has imposed on host countries, the “World Cup Law” would
have ushered in a relaxation of labor protections, were it not for
the Brazilian President’s direct veto.145
In the context of these judicial and legislative changes, the
ITUC’s demand that FIFA require Qatar to change its labor laws
appears less impractical.146  Responding to the media outcry
around Qatar’s labor violations, FIFA agreed to add labor concerns
alcohol at World Cup matches in Brazil. . . .  [However,] Brazil will assume civil
liability on behalf of FIFA and its representatives for any losses or damages . . .
unless incidents or accidents were as a result of an act or omission by FIFA or the
victims themselves.”).
143. See It Truly Was a Time to Make Friends: Review by the Federal Government on
the 2006 FIFA World Cup, FEDERAL MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR (Aug. 2006) (Ger.),
available at http://wm2006.deutschland.de/EN/Content/SharedDocs/Down
loads/world-cup-review,property=publicationFile.pdf (“During the application
process for hosting the World Cup, the Federal Government had already sup-
ported the German Football Association . . . by issuing to FIFA . . . so-called govern-
ment guarantees (concerning, for example, security, visa procedures, labour
regulations, customs and tax law, infrastructure) without which it would not have
been possible to host a major event of this kind”).  The labor regulations guaran-
tees required by FIFA mostly concern the issuance of work permits for FIFA-affili-
ated staff as well as the temporary suspension of labor laws that may slow down the
completion of said staff’s duties with respect to the competitions or events. See
Government Guarantees-2018, No. 2 (‘Guarantee’) Work Permits [UK Govern-
ment Guarantee] 19 (Dec. 14, 2009) (U.K.), available at https://www.gov.uk/gov
ernment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/220991/foi_worldcup_
govt_guarantee220211.pdf (transcribing British government’s 2018 FIFA bidding
agreement with FIFA); see also Government Guarantee No. 2 (‘Guarantee’) Work
Permits, TRANSPARENCY IN SPORT (last visited Oct. 18, 2014), available at http://
www.transparencyinsport.org/The_documents_that_FIFA_does_not_want_fans_to
_read/PDF-documents/(2)Work-permits.pdf  (exposing template bidding agree-
ment released by the  Netherlands, requiring host country to suspend existing la-
bor legislation “such as limitations on working hours or the use of non-trade union
labour”).
144. See William H. Byrnes IV, Patricie Barricelli, Contentious Issues of the Brazil-
ian World Cup Law, LEXISNEXIS LEGAL NEWSROOM INT’L L. (July 30, 2013, 4:39 PM),
http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/international-law/b/international-
law-blog/archive/2013/07/30/contentious-issues-of-the-brazilian-world-cup-
law.aspx (noting that Brazil’s president Dilma Rousseff exercised veto on sections
of FIFA’s law that included a relaxation of “volunteerism” rules, which put in dan-
ger labor law requirements and invited wage violations).
145. See id.  For a discussion of the labor requirements inscribed in govern-
ment guarantees, see supra note 143 and accompanying text. R
146. Compare supra note 138 for the ITUC’s demand that FIFA take hands-on R
approach and require labor law reform, with supra note 135 for HRW’s more mod- R
est recommendations.
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as criteria in future bidding rules.147  However, this announcement
fails to address the ongoing allegations of abusive and poor working
conditions; therefore, the ITUC has also launched a campaign to
relocate the World Cup to a host nation with more favorable labor
laws.148
B. Can FIFA Give Qatar the Red Card?
Despite Qatar’s public relations efforts, it continues to face
multifaceted opposition to its hosting bid beyond its heat, corrup-
tion, and labor exploitation.149  Given FIFA and Qatar’s slow, if not
stagnant, progress on the issue, a re-location would short-circuit
Qatar’s costly construction projects and avoid rising workers’ fatali-
ties.150  It is understandable that the ITUC and other NGOs lose
147. See Statement from Jérôme Valcke on Labour Rights in Qatar, FIFA.COM (Nov.
17, 2011), http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/qatar2022/news/newsid=1544426/in-
dex.html (adding: “As the world governing body of the most popular sport we have
a responsibility that goes beyond the development of football and the organisation
of our competitions.  FIFA upholds the respect for human rights and the applica-
tion of international norms of behaviour as a principle and part of all our activi-
ties.”). See also HRW REPORT, supra note 63, at 10 (remarking that FIFA’s pledge to R
add labor-related criteria to future bids is aligned with own corporate social re-
sponsibility policy).  Blatter has also confirmed that human rights criteria will fea-
ture more importantly in the next World Cup host selection. See Qatar World Cup
2022: Fifa President Sepp Blatter’s Human Rights Vow, THE INDEPENDENT (Jan. 31,
2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news-and-comment/qatar-
world-cup-2022-fifa-president-sepp-blatters-human-rights-vow-10016003.html (quot-
ing Blatter that 2022 Qatar selection was “wrong”).
148. See Re-Run the Vote: No World Cup Without Workers’ Rights, ITUC, http://
www.rerunthevote.org/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2014) (“FIFA and Qatar have both
pledged reform, but their record is full of broken promises.  Save lives, restore the
game’s integrity and the trust of fans: tell FIFA to choose a World Cup venue
where workers’ rights are respected.”).
149. See Nick Miller, 6 Reasons Why the World Cup Should Be Taken Away from
Qatar, BLEACHER REPORT (Feb. 18, 2014), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/
1964708-six-reasons-why-the-world-cup-should-be-taken-away-from-qatar (citing rea-
sons such as prohibition on homosexuality and lack of soccer infrastructure or
potential to foster grassroots soccer in Qatar as compelling reasons to relocate
World Cup); see also  Godfrey Byaruhanga, Qatar UN Review: Crucial Reforms Needed
to Protect Women and Migrant Workers, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (May 7, 2014),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2014/05/qatar-un-review-crucial-re-
forms-needed-protect-women-and-migrant-workers/ (reporting ongoing issues of
women’s rights, including criminalization of sex outside of marriage and inade-
quate response to domestic violence, as well as restricted freedom of expression).
Many have also demanded that FIFA relocate the World Cup over concerns for
Qatar’s geopolitical choices in the Middle East. See James Dorsey, Israel Mobilizes to
Deprive Qatar of the World Cup, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 22, 2014, 11:57 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/james-dorsey/israel-mobilizes-to-depri_b_5865708.html
(referencing Israeli campaign to relocate World Cup, due to Qatar’s support for
Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood).
150. See ITUC, supra note 27, at 6 (predicting that Qatar will spend $140 bil- R
lion for World Cup construction projects).
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patience; Qatar has deferred to economic liberty of contract be-
tween employer and employee instead of implementing systemic
change on key issues including minimum wage regulations.151
Practically, allegations of bribery and the challenges for players and
fans created by the Gulf nation’s arid climate pose a greater danger
for the preservation of the Gulf nation’s hosting privileges.152
While neither of those two critical angles have incorporated mi-
grant labor rights, they have pushed FIFA to provide more ethical
and legal oversight, which could prove useful to increase labor
accountability.
FIFA recently produced a report on the proceedings that led to
Qatar’s election, partly to clear what has already been a major taint
on its reputation.153  Currently, members of the FIFA leadership
151. See HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, ADDENDUM - MISSION TO QATAR: COM-
MENTS BY THE STATE ON THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR 6 (June 6, 2014),
available at http://www. ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Migration/SRMigrants/Pages/An-
nualReports.aspx (responding to Special Rapporteur Addendum, supra note 72). R
152. See Paul Crompton, Experts: FIFA Will Have to Act if Qatar Ethics Report
Proves Damning, AL ARABIYA (Sept. 10, 2014, 4:25 PM), http://english.alarabiya
.net/en/sports/2014/09/09/The-continuing-saga-of-Qatar-s-World-Cup-woes.html
(“FIFA may have no choice but to take action against Qatar if a recently concluded
investigation indicates foul play in the country’s bid.”).  However, FIFA has not
guaranteed that the report’s finding will result in recalling Qatar’s hosting rights.
See Payne, supra note 5 (“Blatter has long insinuated, though, that only he and his R
executive committee — and not FIFA ethics judge Joachim Eckert or the Adjudica-
tory Chamber — could change the hosting decision . . . so even if widespread,
reprehensible violations were found in the report, it would not necessarily mean
the tournament would be stripped from [Qatar].”).
153. See Reuters, FIFA Corruption Judge Doubts ‘If Football and Ethics Can Fit To-
gether’, EUROSPORT (Sept. 16, 2014, 6:39 PM), http://au.eurosport.com/football/
world-cup/2014/judge-eckert-warns-fifa-following-garcia-investigation_sto44031
30/story.shtml (citing statement by German head of Adjudicatory Chamber of
FIFA Ethics Commission Hans-Joachim Eckert that report on alleged corruption
surrounding votes won by Russia and Qatar made him question ethical character
of proceedings and football). See also Payne, supra note 5 (explaining that report R
on bribery likely does not contain groundbreaking revelations given existing evi-
dence of corruption). In general, sports organizations face a higher amount of
scrutiny when corrupt or illegal conduct is at stake because professional sport is
already in the media spotlight. See Ivan Waddington et al., CSR in Sport: Who Bene-
fits?, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SPORT AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 35,
49 (Juan Luis Paramio-Salcines et al., 2013) (speaking to unique feature of sport
organizations in corporate social responsibility scandals (quoting K. Babiak & R.
Wolfe, Determinants of Corporate Social Responsibility in Professional Sport: Internal and
External Factors, 23(6) J. SPORT MGMT 717, 722-23 (2009))).  In addition to pressure
from within and from the media, FIFA sponsors have also warned that the bribery
scandal can threaten their partnerships with the organization. See Owen Gibson,
Qatar World Cup Sponsors Warn Fifa of Damage from Corruption Allegations, THE GUARD-
IAN (June 8, 2014, 5:47 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/jun/
08/fifa-sponsors-play-hard-ball-over-world-cup-corruption-allegations (quoting
World Cup sponsors, who collectively contribute $1.5 billion to the international
tournament, calling on FIFA to thoroughly investigate bribery allegations and con-
form to “mission and ideals” of World Cup).
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have called for the report’s public release to restore the public’s
faith in the world governing organization.154  Keeping this report
private may reinforce the perception that FIFA is not committed to
transparency in its own governance.155  Internally, FIFA has
adopted a fluid and changing structure to hold its members ac-
countable, raising concerns that it cannot provide sufficient over-
sight over actions of its members.156  At the same time, FIFA has
taken significant steps to convey a zero-tolerance policy, even prose-
cuting Mohamed bin Hammam, a member of its Executive Com-
mittee, and banning him for life from all soccer-related activity
because of his involvement with bribery.157  Bin Hammam was
charged with bribery as a violation of FIFA’s Code of Ethics because
154. Michael Garcia, the head of the FIFA Ethics Committee and special ap-
pointee to investigate allegations of corruption in the bidding process, notably
called for the report to be released to promote transparency and reform. See Mat-
thew Futterman, FIFA Investigator Wants Report Made Public, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24,
2014, 8:50 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fifa-investigator-wants-report-made-
public-1411573427. See also Fifa: Michel Platini Breaks Ranks Over Report into Alleged
Corruption, BBC NEWS (Sept. 25, 2014, 6:26 PM), http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/
football/29337509 (noting that Platini, president of the Union of European Foot-
ball Associations and member of the FIFA Executive Committee, joined Garcia in
calling for release of investigative report).  The Qatari government has also ex-
pressed interest in the release. See id. (“The main findings should also be fully
disclosed to the general public.”).  Ultimately, the report was not released and
Garcia clashed with the Ethics Committee’s handling of the report, calling some of
its findings misrepresentations of the report. See Fifa Investigator Garcia Steps Down,
ALJAZEERA (17 Dec 2014, 16:07 GMT), http://www.aljazeera.com/sport/football/
2014/12/garcia-resigns-from-fifa-ethics-committee-20141217154613521561.html
(releasing statement by Garcia where he explains why he appealed Ethics Commit-
tee’s findings to Appeal Committee, which ultimately rejected his appeal).
155. See Sam Borden, U.S. Soccer Chief Wants Inquiry on World Cup Sites to Be
Public, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/25/sports/
soccer/us-soccer-president-says-he-will-press-for-release-of-secret-fifa-report.html
(quoting Sunil Gulati, president of US soccer and member of FIFA Executive Com-
mittee, lobbying for release of redacted report to address “institutional syndrome”
of lack of transparency in FIFA).
156. See Kevin Carpenter, Fifa Ethics Committee’s Legal Role in the Investigation
into the World Cup Voting Allegations, LAWINSPORT BLOGS (June 5, 2014), http://www
.lawinsport.com/blog/kevin-carpenter/item/fifa-ethics-committee-s-legal-role-in-
the-investigation-into-the-world-cup-voting-allegations?highlight=WyJxYXRhciIsIn
FhdGFyJ3MiLCIncWF0YXIiXQ== (noting concern that recently created Ethics
Committee was not sufficiently independent from FIFA to provide oversight).
157. See Bin Hammam v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2625 (July 19, 2012), paras. 15-
23, available at http://www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Award20262520_FI
NAL_internet.pdf (stating that Qatari official and former FIFA Executive Commit-
tee member was found guilty of bribery by FIFA Ethics Committee and upheld by
Appeal Committee, resulting in lifetime ban against engaging in any soccer-related
activity).  The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) subsequently reversed the life-
time ban. See id. para. 207 (annulling decision of Appeal Committee). The Bin
Hammam case was particularly famous because bin Hammam bribed members of
Caribbean soccer officials during his campaign to become FIFA President.
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he allegedly distributed up to $40,000 in cash to high soccer offi-
cials while running for FIFA presidency.158
The scandal surrounding bin Hammam’s actions quickly
spilled over to the Executive Committee’s decision on Qatar, bin
Hammam’s country of origin, as host of the World Cup.159  This
crisis put significant pressure on FIFA to expose individuals who
participated in bribery and punish them promptly, partly to rein-
force the prominence of its Code of Ethics and the legitimacy of its
World Cup elections.160  However, Bin Hammam shows that FIFA
has yet to streamline its disciplinary procedures, even when institu-
tional transparency is in controversy.161  Specifically, FIFA’s Ethics
Committee’s decision and the Appeal Committee’s affirmation of
the finding that bin Hamman bribed FIFA officials provides shaky
precedent for a comprehensive and thorough investigation into
bribery allegations.162  FIFA did not present sufficient evidence to
prove, even by a lower standard of “comfortable satisfaction,” re-
quired by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) that bin Ham-
mam was the source of the cash payments made.163  In its review,
the CAS determined that FIFA stopped short of investigating its Ex-
ecutive Committee member Jack Warner, who may have furnished
158. See Bin Hammam, supra note 157, paras. 12-15 (explaining that bribes at
issue consist in $40,000 cash gifts offered to Caribbean Football Union members
and violate FIFA Code of Ethics, FIFA Disciplinary Code, and FIFA Statutes).
159. See Mohamed bin Hammam Accused of ‘Buying World Cup’ for Qatar, 4 NEWS
(June 1, 2014), http://www.channel4.com/news/world-cup-2022-qatar-mohamed-
bin-hammam-sepp-blatter (reporting revelations that bin Hammam used slush
funds to support Qatar’s bid). Bin Hammam is not the only bribery case that sheds
doubt on Qatar’s election. See Amos Adamu v. FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2426 (Feb. 24,
2012), available at http://www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Award20242620
_FINAL_.pdf (dismissing appeal of former FIFA member who was caught by re-
porters posing as journalists quoting price for his vote because FIFA Ethics Com-
mittee properly sanctioned him).  In Adamu, a former member of the FIFA
Executive Committee challenged FIFA’s finding of bribery allegations, a lifetime
ban on all soccer-related activities, and a fine. Id. at 3.
160. For internal and external pressure on FIFA to expose extent of bribery
and clear its name, see sources cited supra notes 154-157 and accompanying text. R
161. See Bin Hammam, supra note 157, para. 88 (noting bin Hammam’s due R
process complaint that FIFA Executive Committee, chaired by his former rival Blat-
ter, appointed members of Appeal and Ethics Committees reviewing his
allegations).
162. For a discussion of CAS’s major problem with FIFA proceedings, see in-
fra note 164 and accompanying text.
163. See Bin Hammam, supra note 157, para. 98 (noting that FIFA Ethics and R
Appeal Committees applied strict standard of beyond reasonable doubt, while CAS
standard of proof is comfortable satisfaction that evidence establishes guilt). See
also id. para. 203 (holding that majority of panel unable to conclude to its comfort-
able satisfaction that allegations against bin Hammam are true).
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the key link between bin Hammam and the payments.164  This
shortcoming was fatal to FIFA’s prosecution and undermined the
Ethics Committee’s findings.165  Even though CAS suggested FIFA
could resubmit its allegations with new evidence, FIFA failed to take
advantage of this opportunity, creating further doubt that FIFA in-
tended to thoroughly investigate internal corruption.166
There is little incentive for FIFA to improve its own investiga-
tive procedures substantially, since allegations of bribery do not put
FIFA itself at risk; only the bidding nations and their representatives
may face disciplinary actions in the event of FIFA violations, rang-
ing from sanctions to endangering their hosting privileges.167  Al-
though the Ethics Committee and its Adjudicatory Chamber are in
charge of reviewing the report on Qatar’s election, the decision to
relocate the World Cup is only within the scope of the Executive
Committee, whose members favored Qatar’s bid.168  As a host na-
tion, Qatar is subject to FIFA’s Code of Ethics and must turn to
internal due process to contest a withdrawal of its hosting privi-
leges.169  Qatar’s acceptance to host the World Cup was contingent
164. See Robert Hughes, Bin Hammam Is Latest FIFA Official to Go, but Cloud
Remains, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/
sports/soccer/25iht-soccer25.html?_r=0 (reporting that Jack Warner resigned with
“presumption of innocence,” in apparent contradiction with FIFA zero tolerance
policy). See also Bin Hammam, supra note 157, para. 202 (noting that FIFA Ethics R
Committee “disabled” itself from thorough investigation of bin Hammam’s
charges by terminating proceedings against Warner upon his resignation and that
Blatter declined to answer [CAS panel’s] questions on the subject).
165. See Bin Hammam, supra note 157, paras. 207-08 (annulling FIFA Appeals’ R
Committee decision and lifetime ban, while not making finding of innocence).
166. See FIFA Close Mohamed Bin Hammam Bribery Case over Lack of Evidence,
PRESS ASSOCIATION, Dec. 13, 2012, available at http://www.theguardian.com/foot-
ball/2012/dec/13/fifa-close-bin-hamman-bribery-case (reporting that Garcia did
not uncover new evidence beyond evidence presented at CAS proceeding during
comprehensive investigation).
167. See Payne, supra note 5 (noting that Adjudicatory Chamber may impose R
sanctions on bid candidates and other officials connected to FIFA, perhaps
prompting change in hosting decision).
168. See Dan Roan, Russia 2018 & Qatar 2022 Fifa World Cups: No Ruling until
Spring, BBC NEWS (Sept. 19, 2014, 1:55 PM), http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/foot-
ball/29275666 (quoting Eckert that Adjudicatory Committee will refrain from
making recommendations on who should host World Cup because decision be-
longs to Executive Committee). See also FIFA EXECUTIVE BODIES, FIFA, http://www
.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/bodies/excoandemergency/ (last visited Sept.
25, 2014) (“The Executive Committee shall decide the place and dates of the final
competitions of FIFA tournaments.”).  Sunil Gulati, the president of U.S. Soccer
and U.S. representative on the Executive Committee, has also advocated for the
release of the report. See Borden, supra note 155. R
169. See Mihir Bose, World Cup 2022 Special Report: No Legal Action for Qatar If
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on forbearance of its right to sue FIFA in an ordinary court of
law.170  Therefore, its display of disciplinary measures notwithstand-
ing, FIFA does not fear direct repercussions of a potential recall
from Qatar’s end, especially since the Ethics Committee demon-
strated a strict policy when it comes to corruption charges.171  How-
ever, the Ethics Committee’s decision, even if appealed internally,
is still subject to an appeal before CAS.172  CAS looks less leniently
at internal procedural defects and the Ethics Committee’s depen-
dence on the Executive Committee to take action.173  The Bin Ham-
mam case shows that CAS demands higher standards of not only
appellants accused of bribery, but FIFA itself.174
Finally, FIFA has considered another avenue to recall
the vote on Qatar that is unrelated to either bribery or labor
all bidding countries agree to be bound by FIFA Code of Ethics, which like the rest
of FIFA is bound by Swiss law).
170. See id. (clarifying that any dispute is subject to the jurisdiction of Appeals
Committee of FIFA’s Ethics Committee, which is special arbitration body and not
court of law); see also FIFA STATUTES § 68, FIFA (2012), available at http://www.fifa
.com/mm/document/AFFederation/Generic/02/41/81/55/FIFASta-
tuten2014_E_Neutral.pdf (prohibiting recourse to “ordinary courts of law” and
binding members to recognize CAS as binding and independent judicial
authority).
171. See Bose, supra note 169 (noting that Qatar signed away rights to pursue
legal action against FIFA when it proposed bid to host).  The Bin Hammam and
Adamu cases continue to have a domino effect in the FIFA leadership, with the
Ethics Committee punishing others involved in the bribery incidents. See Fifa Sus-
pends Mongolian FA President for ‘Soliciting and Accepting’ Bribes, PRESS ASSOCIATION
(Oct. 15, 2014, 7:22 AM), available at http://www.theguardian.com/football/
2014/oct/15/fifa-suspend-mongolian-fa-president-bribes (reporting that head of
Asian soccer, Ganbold Buyannemekh, was banned from soccer-related activities for
five years for taking bribes from bin Hammam).
172. See FIFA CODE OF ETHICS § 81, FIFA (2012), available at http://www.fifa
.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/50/02/82/codeofethics2012e
.pdf (noting that decisions from FIFA Appeal Committee are final unless appeal
filed with CAS).
173. See Bin Hammam, supra note 157, para. 194 (questioning basis of Ethics R
and Appeal Committees’ conclusion that bin Hammam met all elements of brib-
ery, including being source of cash gifts, because FIFA “constructed [charges] en-
tirely on circumstantial evidence” and presumed motive of bin Hammam).  The
CAS panel also responded to bin Hammam’s contentions that FIFA Committees
did not provide him with due process. See id. paras. 129-131 (noting that CAS’ de
novo review of merits cures infringements of due process within sports organiza-
tion’s internal disciplinary proceedings).
174. See Bin Hammam, supra note 157, para. 208 (concluding that FIFA’s new R
ethics committees set up to investigate and adjudicate bribery allegations would
need to provide new evidence to re-open bin Hammam’s case); see also Jamie Rain-
bow, CAS Bin Hammam Judgment Opens can of Worms for FIFA, WORLDSOCCER (July
19, 2012), http://www.worldsoccer.com/columnists/keir-radnedge/cas-bin-ham-
mam-judgment-opens-can-of-worms-for-fifa (noting that FIFA expresses concern
following CAS’s decision and handed over all evidence to new Ethics Committee
for review).
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rights.175  Because of Qatar’s extreme heat, FIFA is concerned that
it may be held liable for health injuries.176  To be clear, this con-
cern is limited to the projected arrival of tourists and players in
2022—for heat has been an ongoing source of mortality for mi-
grant workers.177  Already in Brazil, FIFA began anticipating
weather-related health issues, which would be substantially more
present in Qatar.178  To mitigate the costly administrative difficul-
ties that would follow a recall, FIFA is also considering rescheduling
the tournament to the Qatari winter.179  At the time of this Com-
ment, FIFA has not made a definitive decision to relocate the 2022
World Cup and continues to resist categorical rejections of Qatar’s
hosting rights.180
In sum, FIFA has taken overt steps to improve its transparency
with respect to allegations of bribery.181  Although there is room for
much improvement, FIFA has created a legal infrastructure to pro-
175. See Blatter Says Qatar World Cup a Mistake, ALJAZEERA (May 17, 2014, 11:41
AM), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/05/fifa-president-says-
qatar-world-cup-mistake-20145167735612359.html (quoting Blatter that awarding
World Cup to Qatar was mistake due to extreme weather).
176. See Qatar Adamant it Will Host 2022 World Cup Despite Doubts, REUTERS
(Sept. 22, 3:46 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/22/us-soccer-qatar-
fifa-zwanziger-idUSKCN0HH1C820140922 (quoting FIFA Executive Committee
member Theo Zwanziger who thinks 2022 World Cup needs new host due to po-
tential investigations of life-threatening weather-related injuries, which Executive
Committee members do not “want to answer for”).
177. See HRW REPORT, supra note 63, at 66-69 (reporting that migrant workers R
often work in extreme heat, causing even young adults to die of cardiac arrests).
178. See Kaplan, supra note 7 (noting that concerns over heat in World Cup R
already apparent during U.S./Portugal game in Brazil 2014 World Cup where play-
ers took water break due to heat and humidity).
179. This solution may still be costly and administratively challenging for
FIFA. See Kevin McCauley, Clubs Want lots of Money to Agree to Winter 2022 World Cup
in Qatar, SB NATION (Oct. 14, 2014, 11:25 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/soccer/
2014/10/14/6974653/world-cup-2022-qatar-karl-heinz-rummenigge (reporting
that European soccer clubs would ask FIFA to bear the costs of rescheduling their
tournaments if Qatar 2022 World Cup is moved to wintertime).
180. See Borden, supra note 155 (following news of Zwanziger’s statement with R
FIFA’s response that Zwanziger was not speaking in official capacity, only his per-
sonal opinion).  Moving the World Cup to the winter seems increasingly plausible.
See Grant Wahl, Insider Notes: Qatar set for Winter World Cup, MLS CBA Update, More,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.si.com/planet-futbol/2015/02/
18/world-cup-2022-qatar-winter-mls-cba-fifa-womens-club (expecting FIFA Execu-
tive Committee to confirm rumors in March 2015).  With respect to a serious re-
consideration of the Qatari bid, a significant development was the resignation of
Michael Garcia, who denounced the lack of transparency and accountability that
permeates FIFA, even at the level of the Appeals Committee. See ALJAZEERA, supra
note 154 (announcing resignation from FIFA Ethics Committee after his appeal
was rejected).
181. For measures taken by FIFA to address bribery allegations, see sources
cited supra notes 157-167 and accompanying text. R
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vide oversight over its own gathering of evidence.182  The Bin Ham-
mam decision also showed the critical role that CAS plays in
highlighting FIFA’s shortcomings.183 FIFA’s statements over Qatari
climate also show that it can take more extreme measures when its
own liability is on the line.184  Prompting FIFA to reflect further on
its own vulnerability may push the organization to take stronger
measures against abusive labor practices.185
C. Recommendations: Ex Ante and Post Facto Measures
On a preventative level, the cases of Brazil and South Africa
demonstrate that FIFA can play an active role in reinforcing labor
protections for workers by setting clear expectations from the start
that it will collaborate with local and international unions.186
FIFA’s positive collaboration with the ILO on the soccer ball indus-
try also shows that FIFA can be a catalyst to enforce existing ILO
conventions and promote labor law reform when the image of soc-
cer is at stake.187  The contractual requirements that come with the
FIFA seal on soccer balls is transferrable to the governmental guar-
antees that host countries must comply with, once they become the
vehicle of the World Cup as a FIFA product.188  The bidding agree-
ments are a powerful tool that FIFA has used to implement adjust-
ments to a country’s existing laws and judicial infrastructure.189
182. See sources cited infra notes 157-167 (reviewing findings of guilt for brib-
ery allegations against two former members of executive committee by FIFA disci-
plinary committees).
183. For a discussion of some of challenges to FIFA’s adjudicatory and investi-
gatory proceedings that surfaced following the CAS decision, see supra notes 173- R
174 and accompanying text. R
184. See Qatar Adamant it Will Host 2022 World Cup Despite Doubts, supra note
176 (revealing statement by Zwanziger on need to move World Cup away from R
Qatari climate).
185. See sources cited supra note 136 (outlining FIFA’s denial of responsibility R
vis-à-vis migrant worker complaints).
186. See sources cited supra notes 128-132 and accompanying text (reviewing R
extent of FIFA’s collaboration with local and international unions in South Africa
and Brazil to implement labor inspections and collective bargaining rights for con-
struction workers).
187. See sources cited supra notes 102-109 and accompanying text (reviewing R
inadequacies of ILO procedures to hold members accountable).
188. See BRAND MANAGEMENT, FIFA BRAND EVOLUTION, FIFA (Dec. 2013),
available at http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/marketing/58/25/
93/fcm-history_161213_final_neutral.pdf (explaining that new FIFA logo marks
evolution of corporate identity into “commitment to transparency and accounta-
bility to the world”).
189. See UK Government Guarantee, supra note 143, at 2 (“All Government R
Guarantees are legally and constitutionally valid and enforceable . . . and the Gov-
ernment . . . irrevocably waives any right of immunity of the United Kingdom and
its assets . . . . The Government will adopt all measures and enact all necessary laws,
34
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Historically, FIFA has not used its requirements as positive tools of
change.190  However, implementing labor rights guarantees falls
squarely within its stated goals and aligns with its past support for
ILO conventions and local trade unions.191  The potential penalty
of losing the World Cup is significant enough to motivate countries
to abide by FIFA standards, however stringent.192
On a post facto level, FIFA has the judicial capacity to hold
Qatar accountable when it fails to implement required labor pro-
tections.193  The prosecutions of FIFA’s own members accused of
bribery showcased a new era for FIFA’s Ethics Committee.194  The
investigation and prosecution of Mohamed bin Hammam particu-
larly demonstrates that FIFA can exert resources to clear trans-
parency concerns and impose significant sanctions.195  The bribery
proceedings also reveal that FIFA has room for improvement and
that CAS can hold FIFA to higher standards.196
ordinances or regulations . . . which may be required in order to ensure full com-
pliance with the present Government Declaration and all Government
Guarantees.”).
190. See sources cited supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text (discussing R
impact of FIFA requirements on host countries’ local economy and population).
191. See Mission & Statutes, supra note 36 (referencing FIFA’s goal to improve R
society through soccer).  For a discussion of FIFA’s collaboration with the ILO and
local trade unions during the South African and Brazilian World Cups, see supra
notes 122-132 and accompanying text. R
192. See sources cited supra notes 36 and 60 (outlining FIFA’s stated mission R
and corporate responsibility goals and speaking of building better world through
soccer and commitment to social improvement).  For a discussion of the lengths
taken by host countries to conform to FIFA requirements, see supra notes 54-62
and accompanying text.
193. See sources cited supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text (discussing R
inefficiency of existing laws and measures in Qatar without enforcement
mechanism).
194. See sources cited supra notes 157-158 (discussing two bribery cases con- R
nected to Qatar’s bid.
195. For a review of the measures FIFA has taken to address bribery allega-
tions, see supra notes 152-157.
196. See Lorenzo Casini, The Making of a Lex Sportiva by the Court of Arbitration
for Sport, in LEX SPORTIVA: WHAT IS SPORTS LAW? 149, 161 (Robert C. R. Siekmann
ed., 2012) (highlighting that CAS’ appellate procedure effects normative harmoni-
zation of sports law).  For the most part, decisions issued by CAS are binding on
the parties and not subject to judicial review. See Mitten & Opie, supra note 140, at R
288 (explaining that CAS awards are binding and subject to limited judicial review
by Swiss Federal Tribunal because “CAS is sufficiently independent and impartial
for its awards to have the same force and effect as judgments rendered by sover-
eign courts” (citation omitted)); see also FIFA Statutes 68 (prohibiting recourse to
“ordinary courts of law” and binding members to recognize CAS as binding and
independent judicial authority).  Practically, CAS recognizes appeal to SFT, but
rarely has SFT overturned CAS decision. See Samuel Morris, Comment, FIFA World
Cup 2022: Why the United States Cannot Successfully Challenge FIFA Awarding the Cup to
Qatar and How the Qatar Controversy Shows FIFA Needs Large-Scale Changes, 42 CAL. W.
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IV. CONCLUSION
FIFA is in a unique position to ensure that the World Cup will
not be played in stadiums built with the blood of construction work-
ers.197  Five years since it controversially won the 2022 World Cup,
Qatar has not exhibited signs that it will reform its laws to provide
migrant workers with basic labor rights, such as the rights to organ-
ize, to recover wages that they were promised and did not receive,
or to leave abusive working conditions without losing legal status.198
Qatar’s ratification of the ILO has not kept the country tangibly in
line with international labor laws.199  In fact, Qatar faces such pres-
sure to deliver on its promises and FIFA’s requirements that it may
face greater temptation to cut corners where it faces the least resis-
tance, since migrant workers lack the resources and facilities to ac-
cess justice on their employers’ abusive practices.200  Despite its
stated goal to have a positive social impact through soccer, FIFA’s
track record in host countries suggests a propensity to seek profit
regardless of the price on local communities.201
However, the migrant workers crisis intersects with a number
of factors that should prompt FIFA to change its usual course of
business.202  First, the soccer ball industry saw FIFA collaborate with
the ILO at the cutting edge of labor rights, not just seeking to avert
INT’L L.J. 541, 559-61 (2012) (discussing rare circumstances where SFT overturns
CAS decision).
197. For a discussion of the conditions of migrant laborers’ life and work in
Qatar, see sources cited supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text. R
198. See supra note 68 (explaining how dissenting migrant workers can spiral R
into undocumented status due to employers’ practices).
199. For a discussion of Qatar’s obligations under the ILO and the ITUC’s
complaint against Qatar, see sources cited supra notes 95-105 and accompanying R
text.
200. See sources cited supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (discussing R
pressure and challenges World Cup host countries encounter and explaining mi-
grant workers’ difficulties in accessing Qatari courts of law).
201. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text (reviewing historical and R
recent critiques of FIFA World Cup’s impact on host country).
202. The migrant laborers’ crisis echoes labor concerns that FIFA has recently
faced in Qatar in particular. See Andrew Warshaw, Moroccan Ouaddou wins FIFA
Case as Qatar SC Ordered to Pay Wages, INSIDE WORLD FOOTBALL (Feb. 13, 2014, 12:23
PM), http://www.insideworldfootball.com/fifa/14117-moroccan-ouaddou-wins-
fifa-case-as-qatar-sc-ordered-to-pay-wages (explaining that FIFA Dispute Resolution
Chamber ruled in favor of Abdes Ouaddou and ordered Qatari club to pay him
back owed salary); Firdose Moonda, Ouaddou’s Victory Against Qatar SC Sends a Mes-
sage to Clubs, ESPN FC BLOGS (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.espnfc.com/blog/foot-
ball-africa/80/post/1853242/ouaddous-victory-against-qatar-sc-sends-a-message-to-
clubs (explaining that Ouaddou received resolution from FIFA sixteen months af-
ter filing, including damages of six months of unpaid salary, while Belounis filed in
Qatari court).  For a discussion of Belounis’s wage theft accusations, see sources
cited supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text. R
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child labor but also demanding large-scale labor rights require-
ments.203  Second, Qatar’s bid follows two recent World Cups where
trade unions successfully rallied FIFA’s support to implement labor
rights protections for construction workers.204  In addition, Qatar’s
bid comes in the midst of a public relations crisis for FIFA, which
strives to address significant challenges to its declared transparency
and accountability system.205  FIFA is being strongly pressured to
reconsider Qatar’s bid due to bribery allegations and concerns that
it will be held liable for weather-related health problems.206
These threats to Qatar’s bid carry a twofold lesson for adopting
post facto measures to avert more labor-related criticism in future
World Cups.  First, FIFA must fine-tune its judicial procedures, es-
pecially since complaints often cannot be brought in ordinary
courts of law.207  The Bin Hammam decision distinguishes CAS for
its ability to lead FIFA and other international sports organizations
into a new era of judicial review.208  Once FIFA’s procedure is
streamlined, it could provide a powerful tool to hold host countries
accountable for implementing basic labor rights guarantees.209
Second, FIFA’s concern over weather-related lawsuits highlights a
key factor for its refusal to directly engage the migrant workers’
complaints.210  Absent a threat of liability, FIFA is reluctant to re-
203. For a discussion of the extent of FIFA’s collaboration with the ILO in
response to rampant child labor practices in soccer ball industry, see supra notes
122-127 and accompanying text. R
204. See supra notes 128-132 and accompanying text (examining momentum R
international and local trade unions created following 2010 South Africa and 2014
Brazil World Cup).
205. See supra note 153 for an analysis of pressure on FIFA to clear taint from R
bribery cases.
206. See supra notes 150-185 for an extended analysis of the risks posed by R
bribery accusations and heat concerns.
207. See Bose, supra note 170 (explaining that host countries are bound to R
follow internal arbitration procedure).
208. See Ian Blackshaw, ADR and Sport: Settling Disputes Through the Court of
Arbitration for Sport, the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber, And the WIPO Arbitration &
Mediation Center, 24 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 31 (2013) (noting that CAS was hailed
at its inception by IOC President as Supreme Court for sports and has become “a
stature that inspires confidence and respect”).  For a discussion of the pressure
that FIFA faces internally to accurately investigate bribery allegations, see sources
cited supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text. But see ITUC, supra note 116 R
(demanding establishment of independent labor court to provide better oversight
on sports organizations).
209. For a sampling of the binding language of government guarantees on
host countries, see supra notes 143 and 189. R
210. See sources cited supra notes 175-180 and accompanying text for FIFA’s R
concerns that weather in Qatar would result in its own liability.
37
Erfani: Kicking Away Responsibility: FIFA's Role in Response to Migrant W
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015





      07/27/2015   11:45:39
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-2\VLS206.txt unknown Seq: 38  8-JUL-15 8:41
660 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 623
consider Qatar’s bid and continues to kick away responsibility, even
at the expense of rising fatalities on its World Cup sites.211
V. ADDENDUM
On May 27, 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) an-
nounced the indictment of fourteen top FIFA officials over corrup-
tion charges.212  Gathered over a twenty-four-year investigation,
these charges include racketeering, wire fraud, and money launder-
ing.213  Given FIFA’s internal measures regarding corruption, this
news hardly comes as a surprise.214  However, the indictment and
the twenty-four year criminal investigation that support it mark an
powerful blow to FIFA’s structure, revealing deep-rooted cover-ups,
bribes, and kickbacks.215  In particular, FIFA’s prior dismissal of the
ethical charges against Jack Warner—and its failure to heed to
CAS’s advice to pursue the matter further—appear more suspect
211. For an estimate of fatalities resulting from 2022 World Cup construction,
see supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.  Two French architects recently pro- R
posed a memorial to commemorate each migrant worker’s death by piling one
stone for each death in a conical spiral, thereby providing a mourning site for
migrants’ families at the heart of the World Cup’s location. See Ishaan Tharoor,
The Tragic Plan for a Monument to Qatar’s Dead World Cup Workers, WASH. POST (Dec.
8, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/12/08/
the-tragic-plan-for-a-monument-to-qatars-dead-world-cup-workers/ (reporting that,
while unlikely to be built, the memorial could surpass Qatari high rises given pro-
jected fatality rate).
212. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Nine FIFA Officials and Five
Corporate Execs. Indicted for Racketeering Conspiracy and Corruption (May 27,
2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nine-fifa-officials-and-five-cor-
porate-executives-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-and (announcing indictment of
two FIFA Vice Presidents, Current and Former Presidents of the Confederation of
North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF)). The
DOJ also announced that Swiss authorities arrested seven FIFA officials within
hours of the DOJ’s announcement and reported the guilty pleas of four individual
defendants and two corporate defendants.  Id.
213. See id. (reporting that investigation revealed over $150 million in bribes
and kickbacks and defendants face maximum twenty years of imprisonment).
214. See supra notes 153-174 and accompanying text for an account of the
FIFA Ethics Committee’s different initiatives to address corruption among the
leadership.
215. See Matt Apuzzo et al., FIFA Officials Arrested on Corruption Charges; Blatter
Isn’t Among Them, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/
27/sports/soccer/fifa-officials-face-corruption-charges-in-us.html (quoting law en-
forcement official that charges “seemed to permeate every element of the federa-
tion”); see also Stephanie Clifford & Matt Apuzzo, After Indicting 14 Soccer Officials,
U.S. Vows to End Graft in FIFA, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes
.com/2015/05/28/sports/soccer/fifa-officials-arrested-on-corruption-charges-blat-
ter-isnt-among-them.html (reporting that schemes included “using fake consulting
contracts to funnel illegal payments; sending money through associates working in
banking or currency dealing; creating shell companies in tax havens; hiding for-
eign bank accounts; using safe deposit boxes; and “bulk cash smuggling.”).
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now that DOJ named Warner as one of its indicted officials.216
DOJ’s indictment is a peculiar reminder of former prosecutor
Michael Garcia’s protest resignation after FIFA’s Ethics Committee
failed to heed to his request for transparency.217  Despite this legal
storm, it is unclear how much structural change FIFA will
implement.218
Meanwhile, media outlets have begun dissecting FIFA’s opulence
under a magnifying glass, widening the gap between FIFA and its
popular support.219
At first glance, the indictment appears as “just another white
collar crime story”; the plight of migrant workers does not feature
in the forefront of this international scandal.220  However, Qatar’s
216. See supra notes 164 (explaining that FIFA cleared Jack Warner with “pre-
sumption of innocence”).
217. See AL JAZEERA supra note 154 (reporting that Garcia, who created report
on corruption for FIFA and called for its public disclosure, appealed Ethics Com-
mittee’s findings and ultimately resigned in protest of FIFA’s lack of
accountability).
218. At first, Blatter refused calls to resign, and won a controversial reelection
as president of FIFA merely two days after DOJ’s announcement. See Fifa Corrup-
tion Crisis: Sepp Blatter Downplays US Indictment, BBC NEWS (May 30, 2015) http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32941740 (reporting that Sepp Blatter dis-
missed “hate” campaign against FIFA at press conference after winning reelec-
tion); see also Associated Press, Sepp Blatter Blasts Loretta Lynch Over FIFA Corruption
Case, N.Y. POST (May 30, 2015), http://nypost.com/2015/05/30/sepp-blatter-
blasts-loretta-lynch-over-fifa-corruption-case/ (reporting comments from Blatter
who suggested U.S. preference for his rival at election, while Russia hinted at polit-
ical motive given U.S.’s loss of hosting bid).  Blatter also dodged responsibility for
deep-seated corruption within organization. See AP, Blatter Says Scandal Caused by
Russia, Qatar World Cup Decisions, FOX SOCCER (May 29, 2015, 5:51 AM), http://
www.foxsports.com/soccer/story/blatter-says-scandal-caused-by-russia-and-qatar-
world-cup-decisions-052915 (quoting Blatter: “We cannot constantly supervise eve-
ryone in football. . . you cannot ask everyone to behave ethically.”). But see Remarks
by FIFA President Blatter, FIFA.COM (June 2, 2015) (announcing Blatter’s intended
resignation and need for “profound overhaul,” including formation of “Extraordi-
nary Congress” to elect next president).
219. See, e.g., Zac Lee Rigg, Meet Chuck Blazer, the Former FIFA Bigwig Whose Cats
had a Trump Tower apartment, FUSION.NET (May 27, 2015, 2:14 PM), http://fusion
.net/story/140185/who-is-chuck-blazer-former-fifa-executive/ (reporting that
FIFA official Chuck Blazer, who already pleaded guilty to similar charges when
DOJ announced new indictments, rented Trump Tower apartment for his cats).
Although FIFA is a non-profit organization, it holds over $1.4 billion gained over
world cups, television rights, and marketing deals. See Arnd Wiegmann, FIFA has
$1.4 Billion Cash Pile to Fall Back on, REUTERS (Mar. 21, 2014, 1:06 PM) http://www
.reuters.com/article/2014/03/21/us-soccer-fifa-finances-idUSBREA2K1GO20140
321 (naming lucrative sponsors for FIFA despite scandals and noting surplus of
$74 million after Brazil World Cup).
220. See Christopher Ingraham, The Human Toll of FIFA’s Corruption, WASH.
POST (May 27, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/
2015/05/27/a-body-count-in-qatar-illustrates-the-consequences-of-fifa-corruption/
(discussing spiked U.S. interest in soccer where FIFA’s indictment reveals over
$150 million scandal).
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winning bid has come under renewed scrutiny.221  Even Blatter rec-
ognizes that the controversial bid may have acted as a catalyst for
the indictments.222  Advocates have taken the corruption scandal to
draw attention to the migrants’ alarming death rates.223  Unrelated
to bribes or kickbacks, Qatar’s “other” transparency problem con-
tinues to evade accountability under either FIFA’s judicial system or
international prosecution.224  The only tangible change to mi-
grants’ treatment is added months of labor.225  Indeed, FIFA has
officially moved the 2022 tournament to the winter to address con-
cerns of extreme heat, although this rescheduling has not eased
any pressure on migrant workers’ daily conditions.226
Azadeh Erfani*
221. See Dashiell Bennett &Joe Weisenthal, Here’s How Big of a Deal the World
Cup Is to Qatar, BLOOMBERG BUS. (May 28, 2015, 9:09 AM), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2015-05-28/here-s-how-big-of-a-deal-the-world-cup-is-to-qatar
(noting renewed calls for revote over 2022 bid and speculating that if DOJ extends
charges to Blatter there will be considerable momentum to relocate World Cup
away from Qatar).
222. See AP, supra note 218 (quoting Blatter that “we would not have these
problems today” if Russia and Qatar did not win 2018 and 2022 bids).
223. See Ingraham, supra note 220 (graphically comparing death toll of mi-
grants who died building Qatari stadiums with construction deaths in prior world
cups).
224. See supra Part III for analysis of FIFA’s failure to hold Qatar accountable
for labor violations; see also James Dorsey, ILO Victory Boosts Qatari Hopes of Defeating
Efforts to Deprive It of World Cup, HUFFINGTON POST (June 1, 2015, 4:30 AM) http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/james-dorsey/ilo-victory-boosts-qatari_b_6990690.html
(reporting ILO’s decision to postpone investigation into violations of Forced La-
bour and Labour Inspection Convention for another six months, while ITUC sug-
gests that Qatar effectively bought itself more time, causing even more deaths over
summertime).
225. See FIFA Executive Committee Confirms November/December Event Period for
Qatar 2022, FIFA.COM (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/
y=2015/m=3/news=fifa-executive-committee-confirms-november-december-event-
period-for-q-2567789.html (setting final match on December 18, 2022)
226. In the aftermath of a devastating earthquake in Nepal, Qatar has denied
leave to Nepalese workers seeking to return to their loved ones or to attend rela-
tives’ funerals. See Vivek Chaudhary, Qatar Refuses to Let Nepalese Workers Return to
Attend Funerals After Quake, THE GUARDIAN (May 23, 2015, 19:05 EDT), http://www
.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/24/qatar-denies-nepalese-world-cup-workers-
leave-after-earthquakes (relaying news from Nepalese minister, calling on FIFA to
act).
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Villanova School of Law; M.A., DePaul University,
2010; B.A., Bryn Mawr College, 2006. I am grateful to the Moorad Sports Law Jour-
nal editorial board and staff writers for their thorough feedback. I dedicate this
comment to my parents and two brothers for grounding me in our shared story.
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